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Introduction 
According to the prevailing opinion, natural resources in general and oil in particular, are a 
curse rather than a blessing. The growing literature on the “curse of resources” and the 
“paradox of plenty” (Karl, 1997) has generated significant causal claims that link the 
abundance of resources with dependence on corruption, authoritarianism, economic decline 
and violent conflicts. It has often argued that oil-dependent states today are the most unstable 
economically, the most authoritarian, and the most tormented by conflicts (Gary & Karl, 
2003). Realistically, oil is not the curse but the “oil bad management” or “oil misused” is the 
curse in the developing oil wealth countries,  paradoxically can see a good example of “oil 
control” in developed countries as Norway and Chile. The developing oil wealth countries are 
suffering the two curses, internal curse referring to the bad management with no capital 
transparency and the external evil relating to violent war. 
Kevin Tsui observed how developing oil-rich regimes neglect the non-oil industry and tend 
not to undertake necessary institutional enhancements and economic reforms. Consequently, 
these systems tend to have stagnant economies and are particularly vulnerable to price 
fluctuations of oil products. These structural problems are exacerbated by the high rates of 
population growth across the world, as well as by persistent corruption and clientelism that 
accompanying the oil-financed patronage.  The presence of these economic trends is essential 
when evaluating the connection between oil wealth and the regime stability. Given the 
carelessness towards industries such as agriculture, Oil-rich governments are forced to 
allocate more and more resources to the aid of expensive increasingly food imports, thereby 
limiting their ability to finance mechanisms of stabilization of social spending and repression. 
Besides the lack of economic growth can force the population to rapid growth dealing with 
the growth of unemployment and poverty. Which therefore form the basis for the widespread 
discontent and mobilization anti-regime potentially destabilizing. Can it be considered 
surprising that, during the Arab Spring, socio-economic complaints were the heart of many 
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anti-regime protests? For sure, in the Arab Spring states where these kinds of problems more 
pronounced, The protests built entirely around issues such as poverty and unemployment. 
Thus, the socioeconomic roots of many Arab Spring protests indicate that oil wealth can lead 
to the instability of the regimes, creating long-term economic problems that lead to popular 
mobilizations (Tsui, 2011). Another long-term socio-economic challenge for oil-rich regimes 
is the unemployment of the most educated population. When in the 1960's and 70's of the last 
century, the revenues generated by the oil were booming, Arab regimes expanded their 
citizen’s access to education as part of their oil-financed social expenditure. However, in 
many of these states, the lack of economic growth caused the inability to find work or the 
underemployment for these educated professionals. This dynamic is a cause of dissatisfaction 
among the educated population, which moved by the non-coincidence of its socio-economic 
ambitions with the economic reality in which brought the demand for political changes. This 
dynamic shows clearly that scholars, jurists, and other professionals play a fundamental role 
in launching and supporting anti-regime political mobilizations. The majority of oil-rich 
countries is depending on oil revenue sector and also depending to the importation of many 
domestic goods like food, this critical situation permit to these kinds of countries covering 
their hard dependency of importation by oil revenues. The largest addiction shows entirely in 
the agri-food sector imports, nevertheless; many developing oil-wealth countries don’t 
investing sufficiently in agricultural areas as one of the important industry because, without 
an integrated national economy, there can be not sustainable food security or sovereignty. The 
challenge that how can improve the capacity of food production in the society that increases 
exponentially, and how can convince the private sector and foreign direct investment to 
investing in agriculture as a complicated industry. Particularly, in an arid, semi-arid and desert 
area that suffering economic water scarcity, low rainfall, and high temperature. 
Economically, in the petro-states, the finance of project depends directly on oil revenues 
means the volatility of oil price has a direct and close impact on agricultural investment as 
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well as logistically, these countries need more agricultural technology, machinery, and more 
skilled labor in which usually are taken by developed countries. The developing oil-rich 
countries possess the two dependencies compared to other world countries; one is positive 
regarding the petrodollars budget wealth and another negative related to the great goods 
import dependence, particularly, the agri-food. The question that can pose; witch future of 
food without oil revenues in the oil-exporting state? Another challenge of these countries is 
the agricultural land availability. 
The problem of food scarcities not just in the developing countries but all the world where the 
population could be around 9 billion by 2060 and how can feed the two extra billion (Bailey 
2012). In 2009, according to the FAO estimation, 70% more food in 2050 will be needed. In 
the same time, the international food prices are rising continuously. Additionally, some 
exporter countries as China and India continue the reduction of its exportation product like 
wheat, corn, and rice for secure the high local demands. The food scarcity usually, influences 
the developing countries that can see about 785 million of their people undernourishment 
(FAO 2015), where the developing countries represent 82% of world population (United 
Nation, 2013). The agricultural industry needs more investment in the sector for securing the 
food sovereignty of the nations. The FAO administration seeking to promote food production 
and security. Especially, in some countries where some crops threatened by the climate 
change. 
This study permits to explain “the resource curse” in some developing oil exporting countries 
that possessing the macroeconomic similarity regarding the oil dependency, and the identical 
environmental conditions in which these countries are; Qatar, United Arab Emirates, Saudi 
Arabia, Angola, Nigeria, and Algeria.   
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1. Oil export dependence analysis:  
The petrodollar states more dependent on hydrocarbons revenues rather than other sectors 
where suffering no-economic diversity in which no-oil industry scant. The Oil-GDP variate 
between 50 to 90% in these countries. This dependency is a curse for the economic 
development that invests in other sectors depending highly to oil revenues where the 
challenge how can funding the projects in the era of continuous oil price volatility and how 
can protect the budget balance in the long term period or the era of oil scarcity.     
1.1.   The paradox of oil dependency in the developing oil-exporting countries. 
The undeveloped petrodollars state budget is heavily dependent on the fluctuations of the 
hydrocarbons price. In fact, changes in the oil price cause fluctuations in national GDP in 
which these states most dependent to oil export for formation of their GDP. In parallel, 
dependent to importation per secure their domestic consumption of industrial, technological 
and agri-food products. The rentier states suffering economic stagnation in many sectors 
where the oil dependency destabilized the macroeconomic budget and discourage investment 
in no-oil industry, in the same time the economic balance depending to boom and busts of oil 
price. From one hand the oil-wealth countries exempt their citizens from taxes and subsiding 
many domestic products, and in another hand, the oil encourage a civil war such as in Angola 
and Nigeria (Basedau & Lay, 2009) and invasions such as Iraq and Libya, means no peace in 
developing oil-producing countries. These violent situation block foreign investment, promote 
ethnic tension and create more dictatorial and military regimes. Today the majority of these 
economies are in crisis either political or economic. About this critical reality, the founder of 
the OPEC Juan Perez Pablo Alfonso said “I call petroleum the devil's excrement. It brings 
trouble, waste, corruption, consumption, our public services fall apart, and debt - a debt we 
shall have for years.” (The Economist, 2003). Wherever, could see the corruption in these 
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countries where one of the largest oil-producing countries is the most corrupted in the world 
as Nigeria ( Karl, 1999). The oil could be the obstacle of development and why the 
developing oil wealth economies suffering slow growth, despite possessing sufficient wealth 
to investing profitably in all economic sectors. The negative correlation between natural 
resources especially hydrocarbon and economic development confirmed by many lecturers. 
Therefore, the economic stagnation is the major problem. Many economic studies observed 
that the majority of oil-exporting countries suffers the less democracy, institution deficiency, 
bureaucracy and chronic political system since the oil discovery. At the same time, the no-oil 
producing countries are more democratic rather than some oil-wealth countries. The oil 
considered as significant wealthy resources but will be a hell for their country if not well 
managed correctly, in parallel the natural resources lead to poverty more than development. 
The economic growth linked to natural resources where the economy of developing oil wealth 
countries growth slowly than no-natural resources countries (Okpanachi, 2011). The oil 
wealth counties don't look to invest in other sectors regardless petroleum sectors like tourism, 
services, infrastructure, and agriculture. In reality, there is a modest investment but not 
sufficient and efficient regarding its wealth capacities. Eventually, these countries become the 
most unstable, growing slower and performed worse rather than those without natural 
resources. The dependency to oil-wealth losing the spirit of action, competitiveness and 
strategic  planning.  
This study permits to explain “the resource curse” in some developing oil exporting countries 
that possessing the macroeconomic similarity regarding the oil dependency (Graph.1), and 
identical environmental conditions in which these countries are; Qatar, United Arab Emirates, 
Saudi Arabia, Angola, Nigeria, and Algeria.  
The choice of these countries based on the data provided by UN Comtrade where taking into 
considerations the states that mostly fuel exports, at the same time highly dependent on agri-
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food importation. The data permit to find countries in the middle east as Qatar, United Arab 
Emirates and Saudi Arabia then others in Africa as Angola, Nigeria and Algeria. These 
countries are under the econometric estimation. 
 
Qatar: This “ Small state,” with the minuscule population about 2,32 million, has begun the 
gas production since 1949, is the first gas producer in the world, the third largest gas reserves 
in the world that estimated by 900 trillion standard cubic feet. The Qatar Petroleum is the 
largest gas producer company in the world. The economy of Qatar is very dependent on 
hydrocarbon income which represents 61% of GDP, 95% of total exportation and 75% of 
budget revenue (Gardan, 2013). In 2015, Qatar gas revenue estimated by $50,52 Billion and 
by $64,53 Billion of oil revenues. Fortunately, in the recent years , the non-hydrocarbon GDP 
growth notably passing from 44% to 55% of GDP between 2000 and 2011.   
The political system in Qatar is monarchic where the Gulf regimes are still monarchic and 
tribalism system. The economic system management basing in hydrocarbon resources, 
primarily the gas and oil revenues. According to Minister of Development Planning and 
Statistics in 2016, the gas price decline has a negative impact on Qatari budget in which the 
$0,00
$50.000.000.000,00
$100.000.000.000,00
$150.000.000.000,00
$200.000.000.000,00
$250.000.000.000,00
$300.000.000.000,00
$350.000.000.000,00
$400.000.000.000,00
Saudi Arabia
Nigeria
Qatar
United Arab Emirates
Algeria
Angola
Graph 1. GDP formed by hydrocarbons (Oil+Gas) revenues.
Source: UN Comtrade.
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hydrocarbon production decreased by 2.8% in 2016. Immediately after, in the late of 2015 
The government canceled the subsidies for water, electricity, and taxing some other products 
and rationalized the public expenditures, at the same time the inflation pass from 3,4 percent 
in 2016 to 3,6% in 2017 and continue to increase that will arrive at 3,8% in 2018. Qatar and 
all Gulf cooperation council countries (GCC) will apply the value-added taxation at 5% on the 
underlying goods price at the beginning of 2018. After the decline of gas and oil price, the 
fiscal deficit in 2016 estimated at 7,8 percent of GDP and the liquidity reduced significantly. 
Qatar's trade surplus in 2015 fell by half of its value (in 2014) to 2.29% of GDP. This decline 
due to the lower of export revenues which shrunk by 39%. Other financial risks include the 
realization delay of the main infrastructure projects and increasing the cost of its 
implementation. The fiscal balance is also expected to remain in deficit in 2017 and 2018, 
although the reduction in expenditure and the moderate increase in hydrocarbon prices will 
ease its sharpness in comparison to 2016. The gas production is more important in Qatar than 
oil production. Indeed, the value of liquefied natural gas (LNG) exports in 2015 exceeded the 
value of all other hydrocarbon products and accounted for about 46% of total export 
commodities. Immediately, The Qatar GDP decrease from $210,1 Billion in 2014 to $152,5 B 
in 2015. Consequently, the total saving rate reduced from about 75% of total GDP in 2011 to 
58,6% in 2015. After the hydrocarbons shock in 2014, the total revenue decrease by 20,7%, at 
the same time the income from hydrocarbon decrease by 23.3% in 2015. the investment also 
decreased immediately in the same year by 7.19% in which consists mainly from the profits 
of Qatar Petroleum. Away from hydrocarbon, Qatar economy based on importation that 
accounts for a high demand proportion  in 2015 that estimated by 44,3% of final domestic 
spending.  
Politically, Qatar plays a fundamental role in the middle east but has a political problem with 
neighborhood countries in which today suffers the “Business embargo” by the Gulf countries 
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and Egypt that these countries accuse Qatar its responsibility for supporting the terrorism, but 
Qatar denied. This embargo has an adverse impact on Qatari gas transportation due to the 
closure of sea crossings. According to Reuters news, the Gas price immediately raised by 
4,5% but at the same time the Qatari money value “Riyal” decreased by 10%. Furthermore, 
many foreign Qatari citizens and businessman should leave the gulf countries. Consequently, 
humanitarian crisis and economic losses. The hydrocarbon wealth gives Qatar policy a 
leadership post among nations, especially in the GCC regions, this position is an imprecation 
for some other leading countries in the middle east as Saudi Arabia and Egypt in which Qatar 
disrupt the GCC countries decisions. Especially, the external policies with Iran which are very 
conflictual in the Gulf, excepting Qatar. But economically, after The gas discovery in the 
northern maritime field of Qatar, the largest liquefied natural gas output, it was a curse for 
Iranian gas exportation. For this reason, Iran attempt to increase its production in southern gas 
maritime parts field by the realization of a new project with France’s Total in November 
2016.   
United Arab Emirates (UAE): considered among the prominent members of the Gulf 
Cooperation Council (GCC). UAE participates by 24% of Gulf area GDP that estimated for 
approximately $348,74 Billion , after Saudi Arabia by 46%, according to trading economics 
estimation. The economic situation of UAE as Saudi Arabia, more oil commodity exportation 
and more no-oil commodities importation. According to FMI, the UAE heavily dependent on 
oil revenue by 45% of GDP that in 2016 produced about 3 million barrels per day, classified 
the fifth’s world oil producer by 5,8% of global oil total exportation (IMF, 2016). According 
to Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries (OAPEC), Annual statistical report 
2016, the proven oil reserves of UAE at the end of  2015 estimated by 97,8 Billion of barrels 
and by 6091 Billion Cubic Meters of proven natural gas reserves, represent 3,10%  of total 
world’s gas. In 2015 after the oil price crisis, the GDP decreased by 4,7%. At the same time, 
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the gross international reserves declined at $85,4 Billion, passing from 38,1% in 2014 to 
20,8%  of GDP in 2016, according to CIA World Factbook 2017. 
From a critical point of view, despite The UAE is “ less resource cursed ” compared to other 
oil exporting countries remains undeveloped countries. Indeed, the UAE’s GDP is among the 
highest world’s GDP, but until today the country suffering the mono-economy regime based 
on hydrocarbons sectors, away from industrial and technological production. A country as 
UAE with its massive exchange reserves could be the leader of no-oil industrialization 
investment in the middle east in which the oil dependency remains the long-term challenge of 
UAE government.  
The political system in UAE commanded by seven monarchical federations in which the 
richest alliance is Abu Dhabi and Dubai . These Emirates possess many rentier millionaires, 
especially, surround the closed monarchical system. Instead, can see in UAE the paradox of  
people wealth or the inequality of the oil-wealth distribution between the seven federations. 
According to some political specialist of Al-Jazeera, the UAE possesses two faces, one 
brilliant  regarding its high social level of life and the rapidity of its business, furthermore, 
considered the largest in the middle east about the foreign direct investment. The adverse face 
seems in the political assassinations, human right crisis, no freedom of expression and non-
political participation. Recently, the political conflict between the two economic largest 
federations, Abu Dhabi by Al Nahyan family and Dubai by Al Maktoum family regarding the 
embargo decision against Qatar in which this attitude cost the UAE’s state treasury about $11 
Billion, after the withdrawing of money by Qatari businesspeople from UAE’s banks. 
Furthermore, some political parties of the Arab world accused the UAE its support of the 
Arab spring chaos or “ Arab winter ” ultimately.     
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Saudi Arabia: The world’s oil king is the largest producer of oil in the world, heavily 
dependent on oil revenue. The massive budget revenue from oil estimated by 87% dominating 
its economy, an account of 45% of GDP and  80 percent of export Earning. The oil production 
expected by more than 11,75 million of barrels per day with  $637.8 billion  of exportation 
budget in 2016. The prospective study provides the decline of oil production and GDP of 
Saudi Arabia which in the last decade induced economic difficulty and socio-political 
challenge (Krimly, 1999). The economic policies of Saudi Arabia are dependent to the 
fluctuation of oil price, at the same time, the kingdom’s command the oil price because is the 
most prominent member of OPEC countries and possessing the largest proven oil reserves in 
the world estimated at the end of 2015 by 258 billion of barrels (IMF, 2016). The greatest 
challenge of Saudi Arabia is the oil shock decline where the oil price could continue to 
decrease until 2020. Immediately after the oil decline in 2014, the Saudi Arabia register a 
deficit balance that estimated by -13,6 % of GDP in 2016. Nevertheless, The investment in 
non-hydrocarbon sectors ligated directly to the oil revenues through the petrodollar spending 
(IMF, 2015).  
Politically, The oil in Saudi Arabia has a regional strategic importance that the petrodollar in 
Saudi Arabia’s Sunni inducing war in the middle east, particularly in Yamen. Recently, on 
May 2017 the Saudi government hold a military business deal estimated at $400 Billion  
which trump’s America. The Saudi political system was spending more for the defense rather 
than economic growth aiming to dominate the middle east policies, protecting its system and 
confronting the middle east dominance of Iran’s Shiite. The petrodollar in Saudi Arabia 
creates the oil-rich Emir in which they control the power of the country and the people. 
Consequently, induced the authoritarianism and this domination has an adverse impact on the 
democracy and political participation, while that the political system in Saudi Arabia is 
monarchic since 1932 from Ibn Saud royal family. Furthermore, by oil-wealth money, the 
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Saudi Arabia promote the Wahhabism or Salafism ideology in the world where 37 years ago 
it financed the Taliban groups in Afghanistan for combating against the URSS “ Russia 
Federation today ” in favor to the United States. According to one former state department, 
about 3 to 4 billion of dollar of donation to Islamic causes financed by Saudi Arabia. 
Furthermore, the terrorism index of Saudi Arabia rose strongly in the recent years, passing 
from 2,41 in 2010 to 5,4 in 2016, according to trading economics. The oil was also a curse for 
the strategic relationship with Saudi Arabia neighborhood countries like Iraq in which after 
the UN security council sanctions on Iraq about the invasion of Kuwait in 1990, Saudi Arabia 
closed its territory where the Iraqi oil pipeline passing ( McMillan, 2006). Eco-socially, and 
according to the official statistics of the Ministry of Social Services, the poverty in Saudi 
Arabia registers a high level that estimated by 35%, whereas the poverty line stands at $480  
per month. However,  the inequality “ Gini coefficient ” record its highest level in 2014 by 
25,5%. These value corresponding for nothing to one of the highest GDP in the Gulf countries 
and the middle east even in the world, which estimated by $646,44 Billion in 2016 and about 
25% of total Arab GDP. In other hand and according to the world bank data, the proportion of 
the Saudi Arabia population estimated at 32,83 million in 2016 that is modest when 
comparing to the public expenditures and the standard level of living. Inflation also has its 
part of the oil curse in Saudi Arabia, continuing to increase since 2000 that arrived at 4,4% in 
2016 and expected to increase by the introduction of VAT in 2018 (IMF, 2016). According to 
the Saudi Arabia Economy Profile of Index Mundi (2017), The unemployment also registers a 
high level of 11,2% in 2016 but the youth ages unemployment arrived to 30% of which 21,4% 
male and 57,9% female.   
The Saudi Arabia institutional systems are suffering the weakness, clientelism, and 
bureaucracy. According to the international budget partnership, the political curse of 
monarchic rentier state reflected in the no transparency with no public budget information in 
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which the open budget index is zero out of 100, in parallel no opportunities to engage in the 
budget process. In the Saudi Arabia could see many aspects of decadence whether political 
stagnation, economic regression, the crisis of mono-economy, the absence of justice,  no 
media freedom, religious fundamentalism and poverty (Raphaeli, 2005). Despite its wealth, 
the world’s oil king remain until today an undeveloped country, although the oil discovery 
since 1938.  
Angola: Angola is a part of the Gulf of Guinea, One of the largest oil producers in sub-
Saharan Africa, an important member of OPEC countries. This country possessing all natural 
resources whether; Oil, gas, diamonds, gold, water resources, and agricultural land. The 
hydrocarbons are the first export resources revenue. Angola is more dependent on oil income 
more than other African oil exporting countries as Nigeria and Algeria ( De Sà & Belpaire, 
2007). According to the U.S energy information administration, Angola oil production in 
2015 estimated at 1,8 Million barrels per day, the second largest oil producer in Africa after 
Nigeria. Oil production contributes  about 75%  of government revenue and more than 95% of 
export ( IMF, 2015) and according to British Petroleum Statistical Review of World Energy 
2016, The proven oil reserves in Angola estimated at 12,7 billion of barrels, equivalent to 
9,8% of African oil reserves in which the third largest in Africa. The decline of oil price at 
60% in the recent years had a drastic impact on Angolan government revenues. The Angolan 
budget record a deficit about 3,5 % of GDP in 2015 and about 6,5% in 2016. Arithmetically, 
and according to the World Bank the GDP falling from $126,7 Billion in 2014 to 102,9 in 
2015, and then 89,6 in 2016 (IMF, 2017). According to trading economics forecast, the GDP 
could continue to decrease arriving until 2020 to 76,78 due to fall in oil price. After the oil 
shock in 2014, Angola government followed the policy of austerity through rationalization of 
public expenditures, mobilizing non-oil revenues, elimination of subsidies, preserving the 
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export competitiveness, reducing the importation and accelerate the economic diversification      
( Mauzima & Gallardo, 2017).  
Socioeconomically, the great oil price volatility improves the inflation that rose from 7,3 % in 
2014 to 32,4 % in 2016. This terrible growth means that the government could not be capable 
controlling the market repercussions in which suffering the inefficient of social policy, no 
planning strategy, and deficiency of human economic capital. In the same time, suffering the 
chronic poverty in which 54,3% of Angolan people under $1,25 per day, less than global line 
poverty at $2 ( Barros, 2012). According to trading economics estimations, Angola possesses 
a high public debt estimated at 38% of GDP. In parallel, the government budget registers a 
deficit of -4,2 in 2015. Furthermore, rising unemployment at 26 % since 2014 and decrease of 
the business confidence index at -34 in 2016. The Angolan situation like Nigeria among the             
“extreme resources cursed” or rather “the absolute paradox” that considered as non-
democratic countries with a fragile state apparatus and suffers the no-investment with less 
diversified economy. According to International Transparency Organization 2016, the 
Angolan corruption perceptions index among the highest in Africa that register a low score 
estimated at 18, classified as 164 of world’s rank out of 176 countries. Resultantly, the oil 
considered the obstacle of the economic development in Angola.  
Angola since its independence from the Portuguese colonization in 1975 suffered civil war 
until 2002, between The people's movement for the liberation of Angola (MPLA) and The 
National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA). This Civil  War financed by 
oil and diamonds exploitation of both parties and by external funding, particularly from the 
cold war blocks; Soviet Union block per MPLA finance and  Unites State block per UNITA. 
The curse of barrels seems on manufacturing destruction, killed about 500,000 people, form 1 
million homeless, kidnapping oil industry staff, sabotage of oil companies, interruption of oil 
extraction operations and delayed the foreign investment in all sectors, particularly, oil sector 
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by no exploitation of the considerable onshore reserves in Luanda capital’s ( Frynas & Wood, 
2001). Additionally, the diamond is the second resources revenues after the oil that during the 
violent war conflict, Angola loses its extraordinary dominance as the world's primary 
producers, in which the diamond's sector remains under-exploited. 
The Angolan “ bloody oil ” induced political, macroeconomic instability and provoke ethnic 
conflict in which until today the political situation remains fragile, maybe could be exploded 
any time. In the post-conflict period, after the peace agreement, the oil-economy register an 
estimable development but the non-mineral sectors remain scant.  
Nigeria: Country of the “extreme paradox of plenty.” the giant of Africa, the most populated    
(192 million in 2017), one of the highest GDP of Africa and heavily dependent to Oil 
revenue.  In 2016 Nigeria registers $481,03 Billion of the budget after South Africa. At the 
same time, the only country in the word that record a budget deficit with a significant and 
high oil revenues. In 2014 the country registered $93,47 Billion of exportation between oil 
and gas After the oil shock price. The oil in Nigeria represents 90 to 95% of Nigeria's export 
revenues that contributing nearly for 40% of GDP. The Nigerian oil reserve estimated around 
more than 37 billion barrels, is the second largest reserve in Africa. Nigeria gas reserve is 
over185 trillion cubic feet (Tcf), the largest gas reserve in Africa. The Nigerian oil production 
in 2016 varied between 1,7 to 2,1 million barrels per day. Nigeria one of the prominent 
member of OPEC countries. The curse of oil in Nigeria primarily is political that between 
1960 and 1999 more than $400 billion stole by politicians and rulers (Okpanachi, 2011). 
Indeed, all conflicts whether political, economic or social are around the oil where the oil in 
Nigeria located with blood. Moreover, the oil created a military conflict with Niger groups 
about oil Delta or “ Oil rivers ” the main oil-producing area in Nigeria where the benefit from 
oil in favor of Nigerian system and oil producer companies. On the front the delta people 
living in the hell of poverty, underdevelopment and pollution since 1960, after the oil 
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discovery and exploitation in which The environmental damage and ecosystem destruction 
due to oil spillage. In the beginning of 1992, the oil sabotage leads its extreme level between 
oil companies as Shell, Chevron, and the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation ( NNPC) 
against the movement for the emancipation of Niger Delta (MEND). Enormous economic 
costs have proven about oil conflict. Exactly, from 1999 to 2007. According to radio Nigeria, 
the country lost about $58 billion, about 300,000 barrels of oil wasted each day. The oil-
wealth in Nigeria is the limiting factor of degradation, underdevelopment, and regression. The 
instability situation in delta Niger has an impact on raising of world oil price. The Niger Delta 
groups formed by three Nigerian states: Bayelsa, Rivers, and Delta. They are the responsible 
for the kidnapping of the foreign workers from oil companies between American, European 
and Asian people. Between 2006 and 2007, about 120 foreigner workers taken as a hostage, 
of which two killed ( Obi, 2009). Oil is a curse for Nigerian people that the income per capita 
continuing to decrease rather than other world’s countries where decreased from $3,221 in 
2014 to $2,177 in 2016, according to world bank data. In another side, Indonesia has the 
similarity to Nigeria in many aspects where the two nations have been experiencing the 
colonialism, having a many ethnic, with high population,  possessing oil wealth, experience of 
military regimes since 1966. In the same time, the income per capita of Indonesia doubled 
four-time. Furthermore, Indonesia transformed from a “fragile” to “Asian miracle country” 
where Nigeria remain under-development ( Fuady, 2015).   
Nigeria today one of the poorest 25 countries where in 1970 was one of the richest 50 
countries. Among the highest Gini index in the world by 50.6 that means the suffering the 
highest inequality of wealth distribution (Onyeukwu, 2007). From 2015 to 2016, Annual 
inflation doubled to 18,6 and according to the Nigerian National Bureau of Statistics, 
The total foreign and domestic debt stocks at December 31, 2016, increased to around $11.41 
billion. 
 18
The volatility of oil price has a significant impact on economic investment. In the recent 
years, especially three years ago, Nigeria registered a drastic decline in economic balance 
where the oil is the only commodity that can control the macroeconomic situation and 
financial stability of the country. The oil prices have an impact on business, especially; GDP, 
employment rate, consumer price and household consumption. The “ Curse of governance ” 
that Nigeria was not capable to manage the oil revenue correctly for the benefit of the all 
Nigerian citizens.  The Nigerian oil money induces more corruption and clientelism. Although 
the developing oil exporting countries suffering from the curse of their resources.  
Algeria:The major exportation of Algeria is gas and oil by 90 to 95% of export earnings, 60% 
of budget revenues by CIA The world factbook 2017. According to British Petroleum 
Statistical Review of World Energy 2017, Algerian proven oil reserves estimated at 12,2 
Billion barrels and about 4,5 trillion cubic meters (TCM) or 159,1 trillion cubic feet (TCF) of 
proven gas. At the same time, the average of daily oil production in 2016 estimated about 
1,57 million barrels and about 91,3 billion cubic meters of Gas production by 7,6% of world’s 
total gas production. Algeria among the major’s oil and gas producers in Africa, the 18th 
largest global oil exporter and 6th world’s liquefied natural gas (LNG) exporter in which the 
second largest natural gas supplier for Europe destination, Approximately for 90 % of its 
exportation of natural gas, according to U.S. Energy Information Administration. Algeria 
suffers the high volatility of oil budget that reflected adversely on the economic growth and 
the project’s investment, especially in oil shock period (Chakouri & Chibi, 2016; Elhannani & 
Al, 2016 ). This situation demonstrates the paralyze of non-fuel sectors that make the country 
more depending to foreign demands and external market price. Consequently, more inflation 
and less competitiveness. Algeria suffers from the “Dutch disease” where the economic 
instability is the chronical curse (Akacem & Cachanosky, 2017). Immediately after the oil 
price shock in 2014, the GDP  declined by 27% passing from 213,98 in 2014 to 156,05 in 
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2016, according to the world bank data. At this period, the inflation raised from 2,92% in 
2014 to 6,4% in 2016. The curse of the oil in Algeria is that the government since the oil 
discovery investing massively in the hydrocarbons sector at the expense of other sectors, in 
which promoting the mon-economic regime. This kind of economy, usually coincides with 
government subsidies intervention and no taxation for improving the social level. But after the 
drastic budget decline due to oil shock, the Algerian government changed its social policies 
by the application of austerity policy in which planning for ambitious fiscal consolidation and 
encouragement of no-oil sector for reducing the balance deficit  that registered -14% of GDP 
in 2016, then aimed to close it to zero by 2019, according to International Monetary Fund 
2017.  
From a political point of view, Algeria as other developing oil exporting countries suffers a 
military authoritarianism, less democracy, one-party government, and corruption. Algeria 
remains a fragile country due to a negative response from those seeking a more transparent 
society. The serious structural problems that led to instability in the late 1980s of the last 
century are still present; High state dependency on oil price volatility; A strong state grip on 
economic resources and political power by a small and elitist group whose legitimacy goes 
back directly or indirectly to the Algerian revolution against France colonialism. Weak public 
institutions stuck in clientele structures, And last but not least, social tensions concerning 
identity issues. Algeria since the black gold discovery in 1954 and its independence from 
France in 1962 doesn’t make measurable progress on both aspects; political and economic due 
to the bad governance. Paradoxically, more defense military spending by oil fund, especially, 
amidst and after the black decade of the civil war period, between 1991 and 2000.  
Economically, and according  to the global competitiveness index (World Economic Forum, 
2017) Algeria suffers from the foreign and local investment due to many factors; the 
inefficient economic bureaucracy, less access to financing, delayed time to start a business, 
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less quality of infrastructure, policy instability, favoritism in decisions of government 
officials, no transparency of government policymakers and corruption.            
1.2. Oil scarcity in the developing oil-rich countries:  
Oil is not a renewable resource, even in some oil exporting countries with a less proven 
hydrocarbon reserves could see a severe scarcity in the next years. At the same time, its oil 
productivity could not answer to the foreign demands market and satisfying just its local 
necessity. For example; According to the forecasts of British Petroleum, Algeria could shows 
a tendency of crude oil decrease production with a drastic estimation, and a significant 
reduction of oil reserve by 2035. Some other developing oil exporting countries with a high 
proven oil reserves as Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, and Nigeria could satisfy its local 
and foreign demands market in a long-term period but the challenge is the future of the 
hydrocarbons energy in era of new economy, and the question is; which oil price 
competitiveness could be had in front of renewable energy ?. Furthermore, The problematic 
will be not just the oil production but the oil price profitability because in oil period crisis the 
cost of extraction of some exporting countries sometimes more than oil price. 
Could inspire two aspects about the oil scarcity; the oil availability and the oil extinction. The 
oil supply in the future could be increased due the increment of the population in which the 
demands of energy increase. At the same time, the decline of oil price induce the exporting 
countries to reduce the export quantities for increasing the price in which causes less fuel 
availability and shortage in the market. Cochet & Perrin in 2009 expected that the oil 
production will decrease significantly toward 2020 or 2030. In another side, the oil rarity or 
oil extinction, the author observed that the proven oil reserves possess enormous uncertainties 
in which the largest oil exporter countries don’t know exactly concerning reserves and 
resources and some oil exporting countries could see a severe scarcity in short-term. For this 
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reason, these countries should think in another economic model basing on the diversification 
of revenues, if not could have important macro and socioeconomic problems.  
In 1996, Uri Noel also observed that non-renewable resources possess two type of scarcity; 
Malthusian scarcity referring to the law of diminishing returns of fixed non-renewable 
resources and the Ricardian scarcity referring to the diminishing of quality continuously. 
Among these two approaches there are four aspects; “Malthusian stock scarcity,” “Malthusian 
flow scarcity,” “Ricardian stock scarcity,” and “ Ricardian flow scarcity.” Econometrically, 
the index of scarcity according to Smith (1979), Johnson & al (1980) estimated by this model: 
INDit = β1i +  β2i D20 +  β3i  D30+   β4i  D40 + γ1i t + γ2i  t D20 + γ3i t D30+ γ4i t D40 
Where INDit  represent the index of scarcity in which taking into consideration the relative 
price and the unit cost, i represent the natural resources that in our case the non-renewable 
resources (Oil and gas), t represents the period, for example between 2020 to 2040 ;  β1i   β2i   
β3i    β4i    γ1i t  γ2i   γ3i t  γ4i t  are parameters to be estimated.  
                                                  D20 = ( 0 for t  ˂ 2020, and 1 for t ≥  2020),  
    Where:                                  D30 = ( 0 for t  ˂ 2030, and 1 for t ≥  2030), 
                                                  D40 = ( 0 for t  ˂ 2040, and 1 for t ≥  2040).  
 
According to the Britain’s Greenest Energy Company about the end of fossil fuels, the oil 
could be vanished and decreased drastically until 2052 due to the continuous increment of 
world’s consumption in which the annual oil consumption estimated over 11 billion of 
barrels. In the same time, the gas could vanish until 2060 and coal until 2088. The developing 
oil exporting countries, in the era of post-petroleum could have the no-oil wealthy budget and 
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no-easy domestic energy. Moreover, when the resources become scarce, the local price of 
energy will rise tremendously. The developing countries could have more poverty and misery 
in time where are still developing at the moment of its “peak in resources capacity.” The 
geopolitics of post-scarcity could conduce to the war where the powerful countries could 
aiming to find other wealthy resources. Especially, the solar energy in which the largest oil 
producing countries are a Saharan area, from the middle east by Saudi Arabia, Iran, Iraq, 
United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, and Qatar to Africa by Algeria, Libya, Nigeria and Angola. 
Aguilar-Millan & Al About the post-scarcity world of 2050-2075 concluded and said; “ If 
humans are inherently a warlike species, a post-scarcity economy will enhance leaders' 
ability to create the war over causes that might have seemed trivial during a time when there 
was scarcity to worry about...”  
2. Food import dependence analysis: 
 
The Agricultural sector in the majority of the developing oil-exporting countries possesses a 
considerable limitation, suffering the underinvestment and lower rural area in some of these 
countries. These kinds of problems induce to the increment of the food importation in which 
the agri-food imports fluctuate by the fluctuation of oil price and oil-GDP where make these 
countries affronting a high risk of food insecurity and undernourishment.    
2.1  Agricultural itinerary of some developing oil-exporting countries (Qatar, Saudi 
Arabia, United Arab Emirates Angola, Nigeria  and Algeria). 
Qatar: Is one of the dry Arab micro-state with a total superficies about 11590 Km2, the 
agricultural area represent 6,5%  of total area, and the arable land by 1,6% or 25,4% of 
farmland, According to World Stat Info. The Persian Gulf surrounds the Qatar peninsula that 
means the fisheries sector is fascinating. Fishing, pearling and the date palm cultivation have 
a significant role for Qatari budget until the oil discovery in 1939, where remain the principal 
agricultural products in Qatar, nevertheless, no others local strategic agri-food products. Qatar 
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among the countries that suffering food insufficiency that covering the shortfall by a massive 
importation in which between 2000 to 2015 the food import multiplied for nine-times, passing 
from $300 million to $2,9 Billion, According to UN Comtrade. Additionally, the constant 
increment of domestic food price. Furthermore, The importation could continue its  increase 
due to the rise of the world’s population, particularly in the developing countries. Qatar as 
desert countries suffers the lower rainfall quantities that estimated less than 75 millimeters (3 
inches) per year. At the same time, the highest temperature that arrives some time to 47 C°. In 
this critical environmental conditions with the problems of desertification, arable land 
deficiency, and water scarcity. Qatar imports about 90% of its local food demand and could 
not be able to secure its domestic production. Its principal’s partner in the Gulf countries; 
Saudi Arabia, UAE, and Bahrain by 80% of Qatari importation and other nations; India, 
Australia, Brazil, Netherland and USA ( Graph 2). 
Since 2000, the agricultural share GDP is under 0,4% that continue to decrease, passing from 
0,38 in 2001 to 0,16 in 2015. This situation doesn’t bode well for Qatari food sovereignty in 
which after the economic and political embargo in July 2017 by Gulf countries, Qatar 
suffering the availability of food products in the market and quickly makes a new agricultural 
cooperation with other partners as Iran and Turkey to secure its heavy local food demands.  
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Qatar as all Gulf countries suffering from low water renewable resources, while the Qatari 
agriculture is very dependent to underground water aquifers; Rus, and Umm er Rhaduma but 
threaten by salinized sea water ( Hawey, 2015). The groundwater as the only resources of 
fresh water is over-exploited, quality deteriorated, and becoming less favorable for 
agricultural usage and expected to expire in few years. Qatar for satisfying its domestic water 
demands agricultural or urban realized seawater desalination stations, but adversely these 
stations could conduce to more sea water salinization, the Arabic gulf could arrive at the “ 
Salt peak,” according to some expert. Consequently, water becomes so salty that the 
desalinization no longer becoming unfeasible economically and environmentally. In Parallel, 
The underground water is fastly depleting due to agricultural misused, wasting, and create 
other environmental problems as soil erosion (Osman & Al, 2016). Qatar very preoccupied 
with its local food production and  water availability, about this reason, the government in 
2008 installed “Qatar National Food Security Program (QNFSP)” guided by “Qatar National 
Vision (QNV 2030)” that basing to renewable energy. Especially the solar energy for food 
and water production with the collaboration of all institutional entities whether governmental 
or non-governmental. This program aims to enhance agricultural and fisheries self-
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Graph 2. Qatar food import  partners  in 2015.
Source: UN Comtrade.
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productivity, optimization the usage of natural resources, modernization the agricultural 
sectors through modern technology, improving agricultural research and training, promoting 
the legislation and regulation, and revised its global agricultural policies.    
United Arab Emirate: The father of this nation, known as “ The sage of the Arabs ” Sheikh 
Zayed Bin Sultan Al-Nahyan said, “ Give me agriculture and I will give you civilization .” 
But unfortunately, despite the efforts made, the agricultural field still late due to the 
geographic position of this country and environmental conditions in which the UAE is a 
desert area with the arid ecosystem, suffering less rainfall, high temperature, strong wind and 
desertification as all Gulf countries. The arable land possessed a huge decrease passing from 
0,72% in 2000 to 0,45 in 2014. At the same time, the agricultural land estimated about 4,57% 
of total area ( 83600 km2 ), according to the world bank. This critical condition makes UAE 
more dependent to importation where the agricultural production is insufficient, and 
consequently, the volatility of the foreign food price and market speculation. In another side, 
the UAE suffers “ The extreme water scarce ”  which the water resources are; groundwater by 
70%, desalinated with 24% and treated wastewater by 6% in which the water consumed by 
agricultural sector about 83% ( Shahin & Salem, 2015). The agricultural GDP less than 4% 
that in the last decade see a high decline passing from 2,3 % in 2000 to 0,7% in 2015 where 
the Agricultural labor force estimated at 7%, According to the world bank. The UAE imports 
about 90% of its food demands, the major partners are; India, USA, Brazil, Saudi Arabia and 
Australia (Graph 3).  
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The UAE for secure its food consumption leased agricultural land in Sudan, Morocco, and 
Pakistan but the curse that these countries suffering from the climate change impact and 
drought ( Sadik & Al, 2014). Fisheries and pearl extraction were significant resources of 
income before oil and gas discovery and until today remain popular products with an 
important role for food sufficiency in UAE ( Fathelrahman & Al, 2014). The food importation 
continues to rise drastically passing from $ 5,4 Billion in 2000 to $ 28,5 Billion in 2015, 
fortunately, financed by oil revenues. According to UAE government, The agricultural sectors 
in UAE practiced in some area as; Ras Al-Khaimah, Fujairah, Al Ain and Liwa oasis. But its 
production suffers from the high costs, Agricultural pest and post-harvest losses due to heat. 
Recently, thanks to the late president of UAE  Sheikh Zayed bin Sultan Al Nahyan, the 
agricultural sectors known a significant modernization. Particularly, by the installation of the 
modern irrigation system. The main production in UAE and Gulf countries are;  Dates, 
Vegetables, Fruits, tobacco and cucurbit crops. The challenge of the food security in the UAE 
is the rapid increase of the population that could grow to 10,6 Million in 2030. Consequently, 
the rise of the food importation. According to the ministry of economy in 2013, the food 
manufacturing distributed between the seven UAE's federations of which; Dubai by 48%, 
Sharjah (19%), Ajman (13%), Abu Dhabi (8%), Ras Al-Khaimah (5%), Umm Al-Quwain 
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Graph 3. UAE Food import partners in 2015.
Source: UN Comtrade. 
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(4%), and Fujairah with 3%. For combating against desertification, the UAE’s government 
installed a program of green area implantation, such as the establishment of forests and 
protected area for protecting cities, village, roads, and farms from the shifting sands. 
Furthermore, the creation of Zayed international center for agricultural and environmental 
research which focuses on the study of the sandy dunes movement and improving the desert 
agriculture.  
The UAE implied on the impact of the climate change for the long-term food security,  
through a program launched by the environmental agency of Abu Dhabi in 2013 known as “ 
Local, National, and regional climate change (LNRCC) program ”. The program aims to 
reduce the risk of climate change and the agricultural productivity shock in National (UAE) 
and Regional ( GCC) countries. The climate change will contribute to the rise of the food 
price until 84% in 2050, Particularly the core foods as wheat could increase by 34,4%, Rice 
about 58,6% and Maize at 72,2% ( Nelson & Al, 2010 ). Econometrically, The constrained 
food imports under the climate change could be estimated by this equation:             
                                  “ Unconstrained,”   for    Rmin – Amax  ˂ 0    and    Amin – Rmax  ≥ 0 
            FIS  =            “ Partially constrained,”   for  Rmin – Amax  ˂ 0   and   Amin – Rmax  ≤ 0 
                                  “ Constrained,”  for   Rmin – Amax   ≥ 0  
Where:  
FIS: Food import status. 
R min is the minimum required food import volume based on population projections.      
R max is the maximum required food import volume based on the maximum population 
growth scenario. 
A min is the minimum actual food import volume available based on the climate change 
scenarios. 
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A max is the maximum actual food import volume available based on the climate change 
scenarios. 
 
Saudi Arabia: The kingdom’s arable land estimated at 1,63% (236026 ha) and the 
agricultural land about 80,78% (3502000 ha), According to trading economics. The food 
imports dependency in 2013 nearly for 80%. The importation increased rapidly passing from 
$9,2 Billion in 2000 to $39,6 Billion in 2015. Its primary partners are; India, Brazil, United 
Arab Emirates, USA, Egypt, Germany, and France ( Graph 4). Agriculture in Saudi Arabia is 
suffering a shortage of rainfall that the average is less than 100 mm/year in normal conditions. 
At the same time, the kingdom among the few countries where the temperature in summer 
surpasses 50 C°. These climatic conditions make the agricultural sectors limited to some 
products as date palm, fodder, barley, wheat, melons, and tomatoes. The agricultural GDP see 
also a sharp decline in the last decade that decreased from  5,2% of GDP in 2000 to 2,26% in 
2015 that means regression of agricultural local and foreign investment. Furthermore, the less 
agricultural labor force that estimated in 2015 by 6,1% of total employment, according to the 
world bank.                                                                                                   
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Graph 4. Saudi Arabia food import partners in 2015
Source: UN Comtrade.
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Saudi Arabia as all Gulf and MENA countries suffers the water scarcity and desertification in 
which the food commodities could arrive at 100%  of importation by 2050. The challenge of 
the kingdom’s government is how could secure the food production amidst the threat of water 
scarcity where agricultural used about 88% of the total water consummation (Fiaz & Al, 
2016). The agriculture water resources coming from conventional resources formed by water 
surface by 2,4 Billion Cubic Meter ( Billion m3 ) per year that mainly located in the west, and 
groundwater by 2,2 Billion m2 that usually supplied by the infiltration of water surface where 
the total renewable water resources about 6 billion m3. The non-conventional water consists 
by treated wastewater for 730 Million m3 and sea water desalinization in which the Saudi 
Arabia is the largest producer of desalinized water by more than 1 Billion m3/ or 26% of the 
total world’s seawater desalination (Ouda, 2013).  
Saudi Arabia for securing its long-term food demands installed a project for agricultural land 
investment launched in 2009, year after the world food supplies and price crisis, known as               
“ King Abdulla’s initiative for agricultural investment abroad ”, aiming to support the staple 
commodities; rice, barley, wheat, sugar, corn, green fodders, and animals resources in which 
the Saudi star agricultural development in 2010 signed the largest Ethiopian lease agreement 
by 10,000 hectares for rice farming, where investing about $2,5 Billion until 2020 and expect 
to acquire extra 290,000 hectares until 2060. In Zambia, Saudi Arabia invests around $125 
million for pineapple fruit production. In Sudan, The kingdom’s considered the largest renter 
of agricultural where 1 million acres approved by Sudanese national assembly in favor to 
Saudi Arabia for 99 years of land investment, and for water security three dams should be 
constructed in the north of Sudan; The Kajbar, Dal and Al-Shiraik dams by an amount about $ 
1,7 Billion. Additionally, $500 million for others water and electricity projects. In Pakistan, 
Saudi Arabia leased more than 500,000 acres or (1,25 million ha) of land, and approximately 
$ 46,2 million of agricultural investment. Privately, by Almarai, the largest dairy company in 
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the middle east, the kingdom’s bought about 1,790 acres in Blythe, California along Colorado 
river to grow fodder in which the land cost around $31,8 million. Another 10,000 acres 
nearby Vicksburg, Arizona for around $48 million. Saudi Arabia, together with other Gulf 
countries, looking for 1 million hectares for wheat production in Australia. In Indonesia, the 
Saudi Arabia’s Bin Laden Group invest around $4,3 Billion for 2 million hectares of  
farmland. But despite these efforts, some opponents consider these kinds of investments a 
new sort of  “land grab or neocolonialism .” At the same time, Saudi policy outlooks for more 
agricultural land investments in other countries as Turkey, Philippine, Ukraine, Brazil, 
Vietnam, and Kazakhstan 
Angola: Angola possesses tremendous agricultural potential by approximately 47,5 million 
hectares of farmland of which 3,5 million available arable lands, according to World Bank 
2015. Notwithstanding, enormous Angolan capacities with the highest rural population in 
Africa, Angola exploited only 4 million hectares of its agricultural land that means the 
country enable to generate its local resources. Agricultural share GDP about 12% or around 
$102 billion of the total budget. Angola in the last years shows a significant enhancement that 
the Agri-GDP increased from 4,6% in 2008 to 9,9% in 2015, According to the domestic 
authorities. Paradoxically, before this period, and during the civil war, the no-investment and 
abandonment of the agricultural sectors induced more dependency on importation and food 
aid by United Nations. The Angolan food imports record more than 50% that estimated by 
$2,22 billion in 2015. The principal export partners;  Portugal, Brazil, South Africa, USA, 
Belgium, and Turkey ( Graph 5). In the same time, Angola export some products as; coffee, 
sisal, banana, sugar cane, and cotton in which over 90% of local agricultural production by 
familiar farmland. 
Ecologically, Angola possesses two types of climate; heaviest rainy in the north by up to 
1,800mm annually, and warmer particularly in the south. The southern Angolan agriculture 
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suffers from the drought that caused a loss estimated at $242,5 million in 2015, and about 
500,000 heads of livestock died in 2016. At the same time, the cereal production registers a 
deficit by 40%. However, this grim situation affects the food security of about 1 million 
people and could have an impact on more than 400,000 in the future that will suffer the food 
deficiency. Furthermore,  Angola suffers the climate change. 
 
According to the projections of  Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), the sub-
Saharan countries could have the greatest temperature rise in the world combined 
systematically with the high decline of rainfall ( Ringler & Al, 2010). Currently, Angola has 
not a problem of water scarcity that possesses 47 rivers basins in which the agricultural 
sectors consume about 61,5% of the total water, according to Aquastat FAO. 
Recently, Angola for securing its local food sovereignty invested about $2 Billion in the 
agricultural industry in 2009, then installed the National development plan ( NDP 2013-17) 
by 7,5% of the budget for improving irrigation systems, supporting farm cooperatives and 
fisheries industry ( Muzima & Gallardo, 2017). In the same time, the country invests in the 
infrastructure for mobilizing the agricultural activities. Furthermore, Angola received about 
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Graph 5.  Angola food import partners in 2015.
Source: UN Comtrade.
 32
$70 million from the World Bank in 2016 to increase smallholder agriculture, technical 
competence, and management. In 2013, the Indian government credited about $37 million for 
boosting agricultural industrialization in Angola. As well, in October 2015, China by its two 
multinationals Hassan and Forever Groups committed to investing a combined amount of 
$650 million in Angola’s agriculture aiming to build new firms, and personal training centers 
for producing cassava, tomato, Maize, and wheat, according to Forever Green manager Wam 
Xan. 
Despite these efforts, Angolan people until today suffers from the malnutrition in which 
Angola considered the highest world’s under 5 years old mortality rate by 167 death per 1000 
live births in 2013, and the Angolan stunting children estimated at 20% in 2012 or around 
820,000 child. For minimizing this dramatic situation, the European Union and non-
governmental organizations gave donors to Angolan government for inducing the nutrition 
quality and reducing the children mortality in which should be decreased by 10% until 2025, 
according to the European Commission.  
Nigeria: Nigerian farmland about 85 million hectares in which only 40% cultivated ( Onuka, 
2017). Nigeria among the largest producers of some cultures in Africa as; cassava, cocoa 
beans, palm oil, palm kernels, groundnuts, bananas, rice, rubber, and sorghum. In 2015 the 
agricultural share GDP estimated at 24,18% of total GDP where about 70% of population 
engaging in agricultural sector (Odeh, 2011). Agriculture in Nigeria suffering the logistic 
problems due to the poor manufacturing, poor transportation, bad food conservation quality, 
and bad packaging. Resultantly, Nigerian agriculture suffers from non-sustainability farming.  
In 2016, Nigeria spends around $20 Billion for food imports, particularly for the largest 
consuming products as; wheat, sugar, rice, dairy products, frozen fish, and vegetables. The 
major’s partners are; Asia by 44,6%, European Union (33,6%), Americas (14,1%), Africa 
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(6,5%), and others by 10% ( Graph 6). The total food imports (% of merchandise imports) 
estimated at 17,03% in 2014, according to the world bank. 
Nigeria possesses a potential of water resources by 267,7 billion cubic meters  (BCM) of 
surface water and 57,9 BCM per underground water ( Odetola & Etumnu, 2013). But 
regrettably, 66 million people have not access to water potable, according to UNICEF. In 
2016, the government for reducing the severe water shortage and progressing the water 
availability whether agricultural or urban around the all country, implemented 116 water 
projects; 41 water supply projects, 38 irrigation projects, and 37 dams, according to the 
minister of water resources.  But regrettably, 66 million people have not access to water 
potable, according to UNICEF.  
 
In Nigeria, The agro-food production in the rainy seasons generally in the favorable agro-
climatic seasons ( Autumn and summer ). For improving the agricultural sectors, Nigerian 
government and FAO launched an project of Youth Employment in Agriculture Program 
2013-2017 (YEAP) by an amount around $235 million, aiming to implement 750,000 young 
farmers and agribusiness entrepreneurs. The FAO’s expertise administration in Nigeria seeks 
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Graph 6. Nigeria food  import partners in 2014.
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to improve nutrition security and public food, support for agricultural policy and regulatory 
framework, support for the agricultural transformation agenda (ATA) and promote 
employment for youth and women, sustainable management of natural resources, improved  
disaster risk reduction, and emergency management ( FAO, 2015). The U.S. Agency for 
International Development (USAID) invests nearly $60,5 million for incentivizing the 
smallholders farmers toward a new markets by a project called MARKETS II that focused on 
cocoa, cassava, rice, sorghum, soybeans, maize and aquaculture (Downie, 2017). Moreover, 
the Nigerian richest man in Africa ( by $12,1 Billion of wealth ) planning to invest about $4,5 
billion for farming ( $3,8 Billion for sugar and rice, $800 for dairy production). Aiming to 
produce 1 million tons of rice per year by cultivation about 350,000 hectares of farmland, and 
1,5 million tons of sugar through 200,000 hectares, at the end of 2020. In another side, 500 
million liters of milk per year by 2019, according to Bloomberg Markets.  
Like the majority of fuel exporting countries, Nigeria before the oil discovery possessed food 
self-sufficiency, but after this period, Nigerian people suffered from many crises of nutrition, 
Notably, the crisis of 1976, due to the exponential rise of population, and negligence of 
agricultural sector. Immediately, in the same year, the government launched the plan of                  
“Feed Nations” (1976-1979), and strengthened after by the “Green revolution.” In the decade, 
exactly in  2001, the government looked for a new ambitious agricultural strategy by “ New 
agricultural policy on agriculture.” In which under this policy, there are two pillar programs. 
Firstly the program of “ National Economic Employment and Development Strategy” ( 
NEEDS II 2008-2011), aiming primarily for combating the highest level of poverty in which 
112 million of  Nigerian people living under the poverty line or about 67,1 % of total 
population. The other wider program “ National Food Security Programme NFSP 2008 ” 
looking for achievement the national food guaranty by ensuring the availability and 
accessibility of  quantity, even quality food for all citizens. 
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Algeria:   Before the independence of Algeria  in 1962, and the discovery of oil in 1954, 
Algerian agriculture covered 90% of domestic food demand. Subsequently, agricultural 
production began its decline to cover, in the 1980s, only 30% of the Algerian food needs                 
(Tounsi, 1995). Until 2000, Algerian policies concentrated on urbanization heavily, causing a 
drastic subtraction of northern fertile agricultural land. As well as the phenomenon of the rural 
exodus (Bessaoud, 2006). All this, in conjunction with a period of high demographic growth, 
the food demands increased by 75%, with an annual increment of 11.45%. In fact, only in 
recent years, the value of food imports passed from about $7.5 Billion in 2012 to over $9.3 
Billion in 2015. Algeria's leading suppliers in 2015 are France ( by 22% of market shares), 
Argentina (16%), and Brazil (11.4%), ( Graph7). The Government introduced an integration 
of the prices of the most imported agricultural products such as wheat, flour, milk, sugar, and 
the food oil. However, paradoxically, the integrated food price could cause for public finance 
problems, in the event of the increment of international price, without solving the problems, 
mainly structural, of the agricultural sector.  
 
Since 2000, the Algerian Government, through the introduction of the National Plan for 
Agricultural Development (PNDA), Gave the way to a new policy for modern agriculture 
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Graph 7. Algeria food import partners in 2015.
Source: UN Comtrade.
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(Bessaoud 2006). Between 2001-2004, to ensure the food security of the country through the 
PNDA, more than €600 million was disbursed for the relaunch of the agricultural sector, for 
promoting farms employment with the improvement of the socio-economic conditions of 
farmers, and enhancing the sustainable management of natural resources ( Khiati, 2007). 
The PNDA, in 2002, was enlarged to the National Agricultural and Rural Development 
Program (PNDAR). This program is looking for ensuring the preservation of natural 
resources and aims to revitalize rural areas through the modernization of the agricultural 
sector by the improvement of the living conditions of the rural population (Akerkar, 2015). 
The main relevant instrument that has adopted for rural development is “Integrated Rural 
Development and Projects of Proximity” (PPDRI), it has been set up to strengthen local 
development activities, especially from a structural point of view. 
In recent years, the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development relaunched the 
“Agricultural and Rural Renewal Policy” Whereas, from 2008 until 2014, implements more 
ambitious policy than the previous  programs. In fact, highlights the urgency of revitalizing 
Algerian agriculture to ensure food security but also to make it the force for the economic 
growth. The first phase of this new policy, which commits the five-year period 2010-2014, is 
based on three pillars: The agricultural renewal, rural development, and the program for the 
strengthening of human capacity and technical support to producers (PRCHAT) (Maghni, 
2013). According to the Ministry of Agriculture, Rural Development and fisheries, the 
agricultural renewal could be achieved through the modernization of the agricultural sector to 
increase production and productivity. Moreover, the integration of 10 priority products such 
as Cereals, raw milk, dried vegetables, potatoes, olive cultivation, industrial tomatoes, 
arboriculture, date palms cultivation, red meat, and aviculture. All this will have to go through 
the establishment of a regulated market system (SYRPALAC) which has a primary purpose, 
the guaranty of the internal supplies of broad consuming products (Cereals, milk, oil, 
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potatoes, tomatoes, and meat) and protecting the farmer’s income. The achievement of this 
object requires the implementation of specific measures for the facilitation and protection of 
the agricultural activity, such as the possibility for farmers to receive interest-free loans 
(RFIG); Strengthening of leasing credit for the purchase of farm machinery and materials; 
Insurance to compensate for any reductions in income as a result of natural disasters (FGCA); 
Strengthening the communication between actors in rural areas to facilitate the exchange of 
skills; Support for the professional organizations; Improvement the mechanisms of food 
production, and improvement the security of the agricultural territory.  
The “Rural development”, second pillar of the new agrarian reform, based on an innovative 
approach, represented by the “ Integrated Rural Development Project” (PPDRI). Rural 
development is primarily focusing on disadvantaged areas where the production conditions 
are more challenging as mountains, steppes, and Sahara. Also, aiming for more efficient forest 
management to facilitate the control of fires. The further goal of rural development is the 
involvement in the national economy through the promotion of local resources and typical 
products, so far neglected, as a potential source of agricultural export. Rural development 
based on five programs, such as protection of river basins; Management and protection of 
forest heritage; Combating the desertification; Protection of natural spaces, and development 
of the territory. 
Finally, the program for strengthening human capacity and technical support to producers 
(PRCHAT), is an action mainly aimed at innovation in the agricultural sector, Increasing 
investment in research and development, and improving training to facilitate the development 
of new technologies and its rapid transfer to farmers. Other goals of the PRCHAT programs 
are; Strengthening of the material and human capacities of all institutions and organizations, 
enhancement of monitoring and protection services, veterinary, and phytosanitary certification 
services for seeds and seedlings. 
 38
The action plan of the government, scheduled for the five-years 2015-2019, with an annual 
appropriation of €2,8 Billion, it provides for the development of infrastructure and the internal 
policy for encouraging the national and foreign investments. To achieve, in the next five 
years, an annual average growth of the agricultural sector, greater than 13%. This aim could 
be achievable through the implementation of technical measures such as the increment of 
irrigated surfaces by about one million hectares, reinforcement the mechanization, using of 
highly productive propagation material, strengthening olive cultivation areas (from 370,000 to 
1 million hectares), developing the infrastructure. Besides, the new program of the Algerian 
Government provides the enhancement of the administration, and regional institution for 
secure the implementation of agricultural and rural development programs.  
Eventually, the strategy of the agri-food industry (IAA program), Promoted by the Ministry of 
Industry set as the primary goals, the intensification of the industrial food fabrication, through 
the creation of 500 modern companies that must comply with the food safety standards 
required by foreign markets (ISO 22000 standards). The IAA strategy also provides for the 
establishment of five export consortiums and reduction of the food importation. 
2.2. The post-petroleum food system in the developing oil-wealth countries. 
The developing oil-wealth countries are unstable economically; therefore, this situation is 
risky for their  food system and puts in front of a twofold question: In an era of oil scarcity, 
what will be the future of the agro-food system?. Also, in a time of post-petroleum, how can 
the policymaker diversify revenue?  The lack of crude oil means that the government will not 
be able to respond to socio-economic challenges in the coming years without implementing a 
policy of diversification to maintain the economic balance, what could generate an financial 
and social crisis as has happened in the past in some oil-exporting countries.  
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The supply of food has been obtained, for decades, through imports. This trade was financed 
almost exclusively by the income from the petroleum industry. But in the era of oil scarcity, 
the oil-rich states should be thinking about other economic models for additional revenue to 
secure the domestic economy. The agricultural sector could be the proper alternative where 
the industrialization sector in the developing countries is limited. About this critical situation, 
Awokuse & Xie in 2015 posed this question: Does agriculture matter for economic growth in 
developing countries?. The agricultural power could contribute for guarantee the internal food 
sovereignty and enhances the national budget. For imagine a new model of development no 
longer focusing solely on the extraction of crude oil, an important role could, and should, take 
on the agri-food sector.  
In our study could see six nations that have many similar macroeconomic and environmental 
characteristics that possessing high income from hydrocarbons, but varying between it about 
the external food dependency. Could see a direct relationship about oil revenues and volume 
of food imports in which, immediately, after the fuel shock price in 2014, the quantity of the 
agro-alimentary imports decreased sharply and could continue to drop by the fall of oil price 
that means the food security closely ligated to hydrocarbons revenues. In another side, the 
figure (Graph 8) represents the similarity trend of the food imports between the six states in 
which influenced by the fluctuation of the oil revenues. In the same time, could see a 
significant similarity between hydrocarbons revenues trend ( see Graph 1) and food 
importation trend. 
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From a critical point of view, many others questions could pose, that how can finance the 
agricultural projects in the epoch of fuel paucity?; and how long time the sustainable 
agriculture will be dependent on rentier income? For responding to these crucial questions, 
the political system forcedly should thinking for a long-term financial strategy, in which has 
been absent for decades. Without a diversified economy, it will be difficult to secure the 
future food system. The challenge of the oil reserve decline combined with environmental 
degradation, and the over-increment of the population don’t predict well for the future of the 
world’s food security (Wright, 2009). On the other hand, the additional challenge could be the 
biofuel economy in which the farmers could be motivated to investing in the biofuels 
production, leaving the farmlands to avoid the sharp food price volatility and the climate 
impact. Naylor & Al in 2007 expected the price volatility in the era of biofuel economy in 
which the wheat price could fluctuate between (2.5% to 65%), corn (2.5% to 65%), sugar                
(-8% to 66%), and soy (-11% to 76%). Moreover, 2 to 2.5 billion world’s people living by $1 
to $2 per day under the risk of the food insecurity due to the continuous rise in food price. 
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3. State of the art in the study of international trade 
This chapter proposes an analysis of the main economic models formulated for the study of 
international trade, some of them constitute the theoretical foundations on which the gravity 
model based. It then described how this model works and the how empirical enrichment 
proposed over the years. Finally, a review carried out on the insertion of barriers to trade, both 
tariffs and not, in the gravity model. 
3.1 THE STUDY OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE   
 
Several models try to explain the motives that lead two countries to market among 
themselves. The simplest of these is the Ricardo model. In this model, the work is the only 
productive factor, and countries differ only in labor productivity in different sectors. 
Relatively, the country’s export goods that produce high efficiency and import those which 
provide low efficiency. In other words, the production model of a nation determined by its 
comparative advantages.  
Since resources are scarce, in production there is a trade-off. When used all the working hours 
available to produce a higher quantity of the good x, is necessary to give up part of the 
production of y. The model explains how trade brings benefit to both nations in two ways; 
The first is to think of trade as a method of indirect production. Instead, producing an asset 
autonomously, a nation can produce another good and market it with the desired good. The 
model shows that every time an asset imported is worth the principle that the “indirect 
production” requires less work than direct production. Secondly, the trade increases the 
consumption possibilities of a country, which implies a benefit from the trade. The 
distribution of benefits from the trade depends on the relative prices of the goods that a certain 
nation produces for determine these relative prices, is necessary to refer to the global supply 
and demand.  
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In the Ricardian model, the trade leads to an international specialization, where each country 
shifts its workforce from the industries where are relatively inefficient towards those where 
are relatively more efficient. Since the work is the only productive factor in the model, and 
that assumed its mobility without cost between one industry and another, there is no 
possibility to be damaged by trade. Consequently, the Ricardian model suggests that not only 
all countries could take advantage from commerce, but also every individual should increase 
his welfare because the trade does not affect the distribution of income. 
However, considering the work as a single production factor leads to limitations, because the 
specific resources of the countries not taken into account. There is a theory, initially 
developed by Eli Heckscher and Bertil Ohlin, which explains how international trade strongly 
influenced by differences in resources between countries. The developed model takes the 
model name Heckscher-Ohlin (HO) or Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson (HOS), by the name of 
the Economist Paul Samuelson. The essence of the model that the trade conditioned by the 
difference in the abundance of productive factors between countries, and leads to formulate 
four predictions: a) The HO theorem: A country tends to export the good that uses more 
intensely, the factor of which is relatively more abundant; b) The price equalization Theorem: 
With diversified productions, the international trade equalizes the prices; c) The Stolper-
Samuelson theorem: Keeping the production factors fixed, an increase in the relative price of 
an good generates an increase in the real output of the factor, in which used more intensely in 
the production of the good in question. In the same time, reduces the output of other factor; d) 
The Rybczynski theorem: By keeping the prices of goods fixed, an increase in the assignment 
of a productive factor generates a more proportional increase in the production of the good 
which uses that factor intensely (at the same time, a reduction in the production of the other 
good that uses the increased factor with less intensity). 
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The model with specific factors, developed by Samuelson (1971) and Jones (1971), as the 
Ricardian  model, assumes an economy that produces two goods and that can distribute the 
workforce in two sectors but has the difference to allow the existence of production factors 
other than work. Given an economy that produces two goods x and y, which require the use of 
two or more production factors, unlike the model of Heckscher-Ohlin, the model with specific 
factors foresees that only one factor, the work, can be moved freely between the production of 
one of other good. The other factor remains fixed, and for this defined as specific. The 
international trade has essential effects on the distribution of profits between nations, and 
therefore the actors can profit as losses from the trade. The theory behind the model has 
specific factors that the different distribution of profits born for two reasons: The first is that 
the production factors cannot be moved instantaneously and without cost from one industry to 
another, while the second is that the change in the mix output of a given economy has effects 
on the demand for different production factors. The specific factor model allows a distinction 
between generic-use factors (which can be moved between sectors) and factors that are 
specific to certain uses. In the model, the differences in the level of resources can involve 
divers offering curves between nations, and consequently cause international trade.  
There is then the monopolistic competition model, which provides for an imperfect 
competition where one or more producers sell products that are differentiated from those 
competitors who are not perfect substitutes. here are six characteristics that distinguish the 
monopolistic competition (Goodwin & Al., 2009; Hirschey., 2000): a) the products between 
them are differentiated; b) There are many companies in the market; c) There is the freedom 
to enter and exit the market; d) Enterprises take their decisions independently, as they were in 
a monopoly situation; e) Companies have market power; f) Sellers and buyers do not have the 
perfect information.  
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In the monopolistic competition an enterprise takes as data the prices set by its competitors, 
and at the same time ignores the impact of the price of its products on other companies 
(Krugman, 2011). In such market, enterprises could have a kind of monopoly in the short term 
due to product differentiation, and they can also use this market power to generate profits. In 
the long term, with the entry of other companies into the market, the benefits derived from 
differentiation decrease by the increase of competition, and companies could not benefit 
economic profits. This is because the monopolistic competition model provides for barriers 
limiting the entry and exit of the actors, as a result, when the price of the asset exceeds the 
average costs, occurs the entry of new companies in the sector, while when the price is less 
than average costs occurs an exit. This process of entry and exit leads in the long run to have a 
profit of zero. 
In the monopolistic competition model, each country will export classes of differentiated 
products with other countries. Although the industries of the different states can theoretically 
produce different categories of products, as seen from the models of the international trade 
occurs in practice a specialization that leads to maximization of the profit. The business of 
these products called “Intra Industry Trade”-IIT.  
In the monopolistic competition model and the model of (HO) with the continuum of goods 
expected the existence of many more assets than factors; This assumption allows the full 
specialization in different classes of products between countries. In this case the determinants 
of trade can be described through a relatively simple equation called “gravitational equation” 
which is described below. 
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3.2 THE BASIC CONCEPT OF THE GRAVITATY MODEL FOR THE STUDY OF 
INTERNATIONAL TRADE 
 
The use of the gravity models for the estimation of international trade dates back to 1962, 
when Jan Tinbergen began an extensive empirical literature on gravitational equations for the 
study of world import-export. Since then, these have been widely used in the analysis of 
bilateral flows between different geographic regions. 
The theoretical concept that the model refers to the “universal gravitation Law” proposed by 
Newton in 1687. In this, it stated that the attractive force between two objects i and j is equal 
to 
                                                             =  	
	  
Where  		is the attractive force,   		are the masses of the two objects, and Dij is the 
distance. G is the universal gravitation constant, which depends on the units of measure of 
mass and strength. 
In 1962 Tinbergen has, therefore, resumed the same functional formula, applying to 
international trade flows. This was also repeatedly used in conjunction with a wide range of 
those that can be called "social interactions", including migratory flows, tourism and foreign 
direct investment. This new gravitational equation for social interaction can approximate in 
the following way:  
                                                                   = 
	

	
 
Where 
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  		is the flow from source i to destination j; 
 	and	 		are the size of their economies. If F measured as a cash flow (e.g., Value 
of export), usually M  measured as gross domestic product (GDP) or gross national 
product (GNP) of each region. 
 Dij  is the distance between the two regions (usually measured between the 
respective centres). 
Noting that, returning to the previous Newton equation: α = β = 1, and θ = 2. 
3.3 ECONOMIC EXPLANATION OF THE GRAVITY MODEL  
 
The gravitational equation can be thought  as a schematic representation of the forces of 
supply and demand. If  i  is the country of origin, Mi represents the total amount of an good 
that is willing to provide to all its customers, while Mj  is the total demand of the country Mj. 
The distance acts in terms of transaction costs, imposing trade charges and lowering the level 
of equilibrium of trade flows. 
Recently (starting from Anderson, 1979) there were several attempts to derive the 
gravitational equation formally; then the theoretical bases of Anderson are reported: 
If Mi  is the total expenditure of the country  j  for all assets of any source i , and Sij is the 
share of Mj expenditure for goods of the country i, then  Fij = Sij Mij. Accordingly Sij: 
1.  Must be between 0 and 1. 
2.  It should increase if  i  produce a wide variety of goods (wide ni) and/or produce goods 
that perceived as high-quality (large µ). 
3. Should decrease with the presence of trade barriers, such as distance, Dij. 
In the light of these arguments it is obtained that:  
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                                                           = 		,			,
	∑ 	,	,
  
where the  g(.) function should be positively correlated with the first two arguments, and 
inversely correlated with the distance, for all i   ˃ 0. 
At this point, necessary a specific form for g ( ). An approach proposed by Bergstrand (1989) 
uses the monopolistic competition model of Dixit and Stiglitz (1977), for different but 
symmetric companies. This model fixed  		= 1, and makes 			 proportional to Mi. A second 
approach proposed by Anderson takes a single asset from each country, 			=1, but allows to 
enter a parameter of preference 			that can vary between subjects, depending to the constraint 
of the market. The differences must also be proportionate to the size of the Mi economy. Both 
of these models allow to consider the costs for trade as an exponential function of the 
distance. 
Allowing the variation of  n  and 			between countries, obtaining that: 
                                              ,  = 	∑  !/!#$%!&#  
Where   is the price, and ' indexes the particular substitutable varieties with the elasticity of 
substitution given by (. If the goods of a given country are differentiated but of the same 
average quality, and subject to the same cost of transport, then it is possible to eliminate the 
parameter ' and establish     (		) = 	 /#$% 
The next step is to relate the final price (adjusted with the quality factor) with the price in the 
country of origin and the costs of transport between source and destination. The assumption 
report as follows:     +/ = ( /),-  
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The price of Origin +, is often considered as the FOB price (free on board). In the basic 
gravitational model are not considered price differences. This is not totally unrealistic as it 
initially might seem (Head, 2003), however it is required that the FOB price varies 
proportionally to the quality of the exporting nation's product, in other words that    	/ 	≈
/.    
It is not possible to observe the number of varieties in each country directly. It is preferable to 
use the property of the model Dixit-Stiglitz, means that all companies with the same size. In 
this case,  =	/1		where 1 is the size of the enterprise. By imposing this last assumption, 
defined as:                  2 ≡ 4(( − 1) ≥ 0     obtaining that     (		) = 	 /#$% 
This implies that the market share for exporter i in Country j is:   = 	,,$%8                    
where   8 = 1/(	∑ 99 	,9$:.  Substituting and adapting the terms, obtaining a very similar 
result to the departure equation:    = 8 	
	    
The main difference is that now the term Rj replaces the gravitational constant G. As a result 
would have that: 8 = 1/	∑ 9 =9 		1/		; 	<			∗ =		/; ( Dove  > represents the 
world). 
3.4    THE ESTIMATION OF THE GRAVITATIONAL MODEL  
 
The multiplicative nature of the gravitational model involves the possibility of using the 
natural logarithm and obtaining a linear relationship between the logarithm of the trade flows 
and those of the size of the economy and the distance.  
?	 = 	@	?	 + 	B?	 − 2	?	, +  	?	8 +	C 
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The OLS regression ( Ordinary Least Squares regression ) could estimate the stochastic 
equation (including the error term C) . If the assumptions made previously are accurate, is 
reasonable to expect the estimation of @ = B = 	 . 
3.5 DIMENSION OF THE ECONOMY 
 
The economic dimension of the exporting and importing country, Mi, Mj are generally 
measured as gross domestic product. Generally, the estimated coefficients are not 
significantly different from the value of one, but is not normal to obtain predictive estimates 
in a wider range, ranging from 0.7 to 1.1. However, it should point out that in the economic 
model the empirical formula of the gravitational equation assumes a coefficient equal to one, 
consequently, lacking a theoretical interpretation for coefficients that deviate from this value. 
There are also other problems that result from the use of logarithms of Mj and Mi as 
regressors. The first is high collinearity (Head, 2003), at the moment where is difficult to 
imagine the world’s large economy do not trade more, in absolute terms. Secondly, since 
export and import are part of GDP, there is always a relationship between  , , and . 
Also highlighted by McCallum (1995), which reports a problem of endogeneity in the use of 
gravitational models because the dependent variable (the export) is the component of one of 
the regressors (GDP). Some studies tried to solve the latter problem by using the instrumental 
variables method, for example, inserting the population as an instrument instead of GDP. A 
simple solution is to impose unitary elasticity. This involves to moving the term refers to the 
income in the left part of the equation. Subtracting    ?	 + ?		 − ?	;  on both sides, 
getting that:  
                                               ?	/	∗  = ?; 	+ 	 ?8 − 	2?	, +	C 
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The dependent variable measures the deviation of the current commercial flow from the ideal 
one which would occur in the absence of friction. The sum of the first two terms on the right 
side estimated as a regression constant; This means that the variation shown as an error. There 
are two statistical tests allow to verifying, if the data reject the hypothesis of the absence of 
restrictions on trade statistically. One of these is the statistic (t) on the constant, and the other 
is the statistic (t) on θ. 
3.6 DISTANCE 
 
The distance is always measured using the formula of the “Large Circle.” This formula 
approximates the shape of the earth with that of a sphere, calculating the minimum distance 
along the surface. 
For calculate the distance have to use longitude and latitude of the “economic center” of each 
economic study. The distance obtained by the application of the following formula: 
                 , = 3962.6	HIJKL	([	LNO	. LNO 	] 	+ 	 [	JKLO	. JKLO . cos 	(T − T)]) 
Where X is the longitude in degrees multiplied by 57.3 to convert it to gradients, and Y is the 
latitude multiplied by-57.3 (if measured in west degrees). 
In fact, The main problem of this method that, even in the air transport, the distance measured 
by the formula of the large circle underestimate the real distance, at the moment, does not 
consider that the most trade routes avoid crossing the North Pole. However, for maritime 
voyages, not considered the deviations which made compulsory by the presence of emerged 
land and ice blocks. Besides, many air and marine routes are drawn taking into account the 
presence of vital nerve centers, the so-called “economic hubs.” 
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Moreover, as various international shipping cartels often lead to a low relationship between 
cost and travel distance; Finally, the cost of packing, loading and unloading are mostly fixed 
costs and, therefore, do not undergo changes with the distance. 
Take together; these elements suggest that the distance should have a slight influence on 
trade; however, the distance hinders the trade enormously. An analysis conducted by Head 
and Disdier on the estimation of the distance in the gravitational models, starting from 595 
regressions reported in approximately 35 works, showed  how the elasticity value (θ) 
concerning the distance is equal to 0.94. That means the doubling of distance trading roughly 
to  halve. The study sample covered a historical period from 1928 to 1995, and the trading 
partners were mostly nations, although some results have been included on the provinces of 
Canada. 
Leamer and Levinsohn (1994) researched empirical evidence of international trade, 
identifying the effect of distance on international trade as “the clearest and most robust 
empirical evidence in economics.” An effect of 0.6 found in their study. 
On the grounds of this enormous influence of distance on trade, the economists formulated six 
main explanations (Head, 2003):  
1. The distance is a transport cost proxy. For several authors, shipping costs (transport and 
insurance costs) can explain, in large part, the influence of distance; 
2. The distance implies a loss of time during shipping. For perishable goods, the probability 
of non-alteration is inversely proportional to the time of transport. The meaning of 
perishability can interpret in a rather broad manner, including the following risks: 
a) Damage or loss of property due to bad weather or ill-treatment; 
b)  Decomposition and ruin of organic matter; 
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c) Loss of market (the possible buyer becomes unable or no longer willing to make the 
payment). 
3. Synchronization costs; When businesses combine different inputs into the production 
process, there is a need for these inputs to arrive in time to the appearance of 
“bottlenecks.” One possibility to get around this problem is to use stores to maintain a 
supply of each input, but this approach has several drawbacks (increased costs, 
technological obsolescence, changing tastes, and low pressure on quality controls). 
Replenish of inputs from neighboring firms then lowers the synchronization costs; 
4. Communication costs; According to Paul Krugman (1991), the distance influences the 
possibility of personal contacts between suppliers and customers;  
5. Transaction costs. The distance can also  link to the research costs of commercial 
opportunities and the establishment of a fiduciary relationship between two potential 
trading partners; 
6. Cultural distance; The increase of the geographic distance leads to the increment of the 
cultural distance. Cultural differences can prevent trade in different ways, such as 
hindering communications, generating misunderstandings, and contrasts in the form of 
negotiation. 
 
3.7 ISOLATION  
 
Several jobs implicitly assume  Rj  is constant between nations and therefore represent the 
intercept in the regression equation. On the other hand, Rj is essential, as it reproduces the 
alternatives set of each importer. Countries with different suppliers of goods, which are 
generally also those with low Rj values, import less from each specific supplier. Some studies 
considered variables such as, referring to them, as “isolation.” (remoteness). However, some 
of these measures differ from the correct theoretical  Rj, which could be problematic. For 
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example, Helliwell (1998) measures isolation as   8U =	∑ ,99 	/	9. This method makes 
the isolation variable very high if includes distant nations ( high ,9) , and at the same time, 
the small dimensions ( low	9). Because in the literature there is usually θ ≈ 1 (Head, 2003), 
a better insulation measurement is 1/(	∑ 99 	/	,9). In This formula the dimension of very 
distant nations becomes irrelevant. The importance of isolation in current trade patterns can 
be easily illustrated, comparing trade between Australia and New Zealand with trade between 
Austria and Portugal. The distance between the two  major cities of the respective couples is 
the same: Lisbon-Vienna and Auckland-Cambera, are among them 1430 miles. Moreover, the 
product of their GDP is similar, with that of the two oceanic countries that is smaller than 
20%.  Consequently, excluding isolation, the gravitational model predict that trade between 
Austria and Portugal is slightly higher. In fact, in the year in which the analysis refers, trade 
between Australia and New Zealand was nine times higher than that between Austria and 
Portugal. 
3.8 ENRICHMENT OF THE GRAVITATIONAL MODEL 
  
Although the gravitational model provides good results in explaining trade using only the 
economic dimension and the distance between two regions, there is an immense commercial 
variability that cannot be explained. For this reason over the years many authors have added 
other variables, Although not of the same theoretical basis, only because past studies had 
shown that contributed to enrich the empirical formulation. The main are:  
Income per capita: 
Several authors estimate the gravitational model through the logarithm of the income per 
capita ?	/VWV  of the importer and exporter countries, including also the logarithm of the 
total income ?	  (Suaré, 2006; Head and Mayer, 2010; Fieler 2011).   
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The idea behind the use of this variable is that countries with high income generally trade 
more. Two possible causes of this fact can attributed to a better transport network (internal 
roads, ports, airports, etc.),  and generally, to the lower tariffs applied by high-income 
countries. On the other hand, a clearing effect may be represented by the fact that the latter 
tend be more oriented towards the purchase of services, involving a lower level of trade in 
goods for a given level of GDP. 
The estimated coefficients of the logarithm of GDP per capita show considerable variations 
between nations, ranging from a minimum of 0.2 to a maximum of 1. 
Adjacency:   
Adjacent or contiguous countries are those that share a border. Several studies include a 
variable dummy to identify this proximity. 
The estimated coefficients are generally close to 0.5, suggesting that trade increases by about 
half in case of sharing a border. It is not clear why the adjacency should be considered 
important, if already including the distance in the model. One possible explanation is that the 
distance of the states based on two points can lead to an overestimation of the same, because 
neighboring countries often have large volumes of trade (Head, 2003).  A further theory is 
that the adjacency tends to provide qualitative information that allows to discriminate the 
distance, instead ,which is a purely quantitative information.  
Common language and colonial ties: 
These variables resume the theory that the impediment to trade exerted by distance is due to 
transaction costs caused by the difficulty of communication and cultural differences. As a 
result, it is reasonable to expect that countries speak the same language trading more. 
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Empirical evidence strongly confirms this hypothesis. Two countries with the same official 
idiom trade two or three times more than those who do not share any language.  
A part of this phenomenon due to the fact that there is usually also a common historical past 
that has led the two countries to speak the same language. As a result, colonial bonds are also 
positively correlated with trade. 
By including these variables as a control, allows reducing the effect of the language, which is 
usually still high. 
Border Effects: 
A more recent literature, begun in 1995 by John McCallum, studies why the frontiers of a 
country affect trade. 
Regarding the Borderless World, K. Ohmae and McKinsey assert that “National frontiers 
have actually disappeared and the economic logic that made them useful lines of demarcation 
at first.”  
McCallum's examination of Canadian trade determinants shows that, in fact, national 
boundaries have a significant effect, since the Canadian provinces trade 20 times more with 
other Canadian provinces than American provinces, with the same distance and the same 
economic size. The practical example reported by the author considers Ontario's expeditions 
to British Columbia (BC) and the Washington State. The distance is the same, but in one case 
there is the border crossing while another does not.  
In the case the borders have an irrelevant effect, the gravitational model predicts that exports 
to the BC should be 60% of exports to Washington due to the size of the two economies. 
Instead, BC receives from Ontario a quantity of goods 12.6 times higher than Washington. 
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Consequently, in this case, the effect of the border, defined as current trade divided by the 
expected one, is                           12.6 / 0.6 = 21. 
With the establishment of Canada-US Free trade Agreement The trade between these two 
nations increased rapidly, and the effect of the borders fell to an average of 12. Instead, 
Anderson and Van Wincoop found more content results, showing how the frontiers reduce the 
trade by 29% between industrialized countries.  
The effects of borders can also be calculated without intra-national trade flows, which are 
available only for a few countries. This method, developed by Shang Jin Wei, therefore 
requires estimates of intra-national distances. The effects of borders can also be calculated 
without intra-national trade flows, which are only available for a few countries.  
Evaluation of favorable trade policies: 
Countries often establish preferential agreements with the aim of facilitating mutual trade. 
The liberalization agreements between different geographically close countries (e.g. European 
Common Market, NAFTA) or not, have rapidly increased since the mid-80.  
Generally, the Free trade agreements-FTAs increased the trade by 50%, although a study by 
Frankel and Rose (2000) reports how the FTAs lead to triple the trade between the countries 
that stipulate the agreement. 
3.9 STATE OF THE ART ON THE USE OF GRAVITATIONAL MODELS IN INTERNATIONAL 
TRADE 
 
Gravitational models widely used to make inference on the effect on international trade in 
distance (Disdier, 2008), Common Borders (McCallum, 1995), Tariffs (Baier and Bergstrand, 
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2007), Technical Barriers to trade (Maskus and Al, 2000), fixed costs to trade between nations 
(Helpman, Melitz and Rubinstein, 2008), and other costs to trade. 
Gravitational equations used for decades thanks to their outstanding empirical performance 
but lacked theoretical foundations until Anderson (1979) that proposed these foundations in 
the presence of imperfect substitution between goods. The theory explains that in addition to 
an influence exerted by the size of their economies, trade between two regions decreases 
according to the existing bilateral barriers, the average trade barrier that has towards all other 
partners. Consequently, The more significant is the resistance to trade towards all other 
regions, the higher is the push to trade towards a given partner. Anderson also introduced the 
theoretical foundations for the use of the gravitational model with constant elasticity of 
substitution (CES). The replacement elasticity estimated with a regression of the bilateral 
flows on the basis of different control variables and a measure of the costs to the trade. The 
coefficient of trade costs is then used as a replacement elasticity between the varieties.  
Since the end of the 80, there have been numerous applications of this model, both in its 
classical form and including new explanatory variables. In particular, gravitational equations 
have been widely used to assess the effects of the various national provisions on trade, such as 
tariff agreements, exchange rates, but also the importance of other parameters such as 
language, ethnicity, and borders. 
Further developments shown the consistency of gravitational equations even in the case of 
situations characterized by monopolistic competition (Bergstrand, 1989). Deardoff (1998) 
also establishes connections between the Heckscher-Ohlin and gravitational models. One of 
the most cited works in the use of the gravity model in international trade is McCallum 
(1995), which uses a gravitational equation where the bilateral commercial flow depends on 
the outputs of both regions, from their distant and whether or not separated from a frontier.  
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McCallum, otherwise , what was done in most of the literature, does not use data on 
international trade to estimate the impact of barriers for trade, but uses a combination of intra-
national and international trade data to estimate the effect of the variable “nation” (and 
therefore frontier) between the determinants of trade. To insert a dummy variable into the 
equation, which assumes the value one, if deals with trade between state provinces and zero if 
instead, the business takes place between region and state abroad. The results show that at the 
parity of GDP and distance of two geographic regions, the trade considerably more, if are not 
separated from a frontier. 
Anderson and Van Wincoop (2003) claim that the original model proposed by Tinbergen has 
some shortcomings due to the lack of a variable that measures a hypothetical medium-trade 
barrier, which named the “multilateral resistance.” In literature is often not considered this 
multilateral resistance, or is included in the variable “isolation”, related to the distance 
between the two trading partners. The variable isolation does not captures any of the other 
trade barriers, and, even if the distance is the only bilateral barrier, its functional form is in 
conflict with the theory (Bergstrand, 1989). 
The aims are to solve the “border puzzle” of McCallum, estimating in a first phase the 
gravitational equation based on what is proposed by McCallum (1995), but adding the 
variables of multilateral resistance. Instead, the second step is to perform a comparative 
statistic of general equilibrium, removing the border between the United States and Canada to 
determine the effects of borders in international trade. It found that borders reducing bilateral 
trade with a substantial magnitude. The results of several study, which show a much higher 
border effect is attributed to the fact that (i) consider the effect of frontiers by comparing 
intra-national trade with the international one, (ii) that the effect of frontiers is large 
intrinsically for small nations and (iii) that the not considered variables push the estimation of 
the effects of the borders upward. The Results show once again that the use of the 
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gravitational model in its basic form not only increases the estimation of the effect of the 
borders but also produces potential inconsistencies in estimating the level of aggregation 
between different Business partners.  
Also, a similar approach developed by Head and Mayer (2000), which always takes into 
account the multilateral resistance in the determination of commercial flows, but differs from 
the model of Anderson to use an empirical specification of two steps, instead, of the fixed 
effects for the control of the multilateral resistance. In addition, the model of Head and Mayer 
allows to modeling the asymmetry in the consumer preferences, which is the traditional 
version of gravity are considered equal for all countries and captured by the fixed effects. This 
model used by Olper and Raimondi (2008a) to explain the effects of frontiers in the trade in 
agri-food products between the United States, Canada, the European Union and Japan, by 
detecting the existence of important asymmetries Market access. The results show an essential 
role of policies, information costs and cultural proximity in explanation the incidence of the 
border, while tariff and non-tariff barriers can able jointly explain 28% of trade reduction.  
The multilateral resistance  also included by Xiong and Beghin (2011a) on the effect of 
European regulation of aflatoxin on African peanut export. It reported as main problems of 
the gravitational models the presence of zero to the trade and the heteroscedasticity, which 
makes it impossible to interpret as truthful the elasticities provided by the models log-
linearized. Several estimation techniques used for the gravitational model: the Trun-OLS, the 
HMR (Helpman-Melitz-Rubinstein) and the maximum likelihood models. The latter are the 
PPML (Poisson pseudo-maximun-likelihood) proposed by Silva and Tenreyro (2006) and the 
variants proposed by Burger et al. (2009) To adapt to the large dispersion of data resulting 
from the presence of zero: The negative binomial pseudo-maximun-likelihood estimator 
(NBPML), the zero-inflated Poisson pseudo-maximun-likelihood model (ZINPML) and the 
zero-inflated negative Binomial pseudo-maximun-likelihood  model (ZINBPML). Their 
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results resulted in believing the model Trun-OLS lower than the others because of its inability 
to explain zeros and access to the market, while the most suitable one proved the ZINBPML 
followed by the HMR. Their results have led the Trun-OLS model to be inferior to others due 
to its inability to explain zero and access to the market, While the most suitable one proved 
the ZINBPML followed by the HMR. 
A very bright discussion point on gravitational models is the use of OLS estimates. Silva and 
Tenreyro (2006) move a critique to the usual practice of interpreting logarithmic patterns 
where elasticity estimated through OLS, which can lead to misleading results in the presence 
of Heteroscedasticity. Because the expected value of the logarithm of a random variable 
depends on the moments of its distribution. Also, if the errors are heteroscedastic, the 
transformed errors are correlated with the covariate. A further disadvantage of the use of the 
linear logarithmic model that is incompatible with the presence of zero in trade data, which 
leads to unsatisfactory solutions to remedy the problem, such as the elimination of Zero from 
the sample or additional nonlinear transformations of the dependent variable. The authors 
assert that the gravitational models, with constant elasticity generally, should be estimated in 
their multiplication form and propose a method of estimation of type pseudo-maximum-
likelihood (PML). This method able to be consistent even in the presence of 
heteroscedasticity, providing an optimal solution even to the problems posed by the presence 
of zeros in the dependent variable. Comparing the results obtained with the PML and OLS 
techniques using the Monte Carlo method, is highlighted that the latter tends to overestimate 
the coefficients of GDP (the PML technique signals them lower than the unit, unlike what is 
reported in the classical bibliography using the OLS method), as well as the role of colonial 
ties and geographical distance (Silva and Tenreyro, 2006). 
However, several authors continue to use the OLS, among these Baier and Bergstrand (2009), 
employing this method to approximate the costs of international trade using an equation of 
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gravity type. Helpman & Al (2008) Developed a method for estimating international trade of 
gravitational models, which allows predicting positive but also nil trade flows between pairs 
of countries, and allows the variation of the number of exporters to a determined  Nation. 
Allows also decomposing the impact of the clutches on trade in intensive and extensive 
margins, where the first refers to the volumes marketed by the exporter and the second to the 
number of exporters. This model produces a generalized gravitational equation that allows the 
selection of companies in the export market and their impact on the marketed volumes. 
Subsequently, the two-step estimation procedure developed that uses an equation to select the 
trading partners in the first phase and an equation of the trade flows in the second. This 
procedure implemented by parametric, semi-parametric and non-parametric, showing that in 
all three cases the effects of the restriction on the estimated trade are similar. By acting in this 
way, the authors were able to estimate the extensive and intensive trade margins, 
demonstrating that the classical estimates lack objectivity and that most of the alterations are 
not due to the selection but to the omission of extensive margins. Among the works that 
employ a gravitational model for the study of the determinants of international trade, found  
Cipollina e Salvatici (2010) who use a gravity model to estimate the effect of the reciprocal 
trade agreements (RTAs) in Trade flows between two partner countries, using a meta-analysis 
approach. The results obtained made it possible to reject with the standard level of 
significance that the RTAs do no effect in the trade. In particular, time estimates of the 
relevant parameters obtained from different studies  used as single observations for the 
Multiple regression analysis models (MRA), adopting the method of the weighted least 
squares – WLS, and testing the Robustness and sensitivity of the results. Subsequently, a 
focus is on the effects of specific FTAs on trade, using a probit model to identify which 
factors contribute to the positive and significant impact that RTAs possessed on bilateral 
trade. The study also criticized the use of the fixed-effect model (FEM) for the estimation of 
gravity, since there is a part of the literature that demonstrates the inability to summarize high 
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heterogeneity through an estimation of fixed effects. For this reason, a random effect (REM) 
model used. 
Raimondi and Olper (2010) Use a gravitational model to study the effect of the elimination of 
tariffs in 18 agri-food sectors, in a broad sample of developed and developing countries. 
Using the CES Monopolistic competition model introduced by Krugman (1980) 
complemented by a rich set of international asymmetries as proposed by Lai and Zhu (2004), 
that estimated the elasticity of substitution by simulating the consequences of abolishing 
duties. The study shows a significant variation in the estimated elasticity, depending on the 
model econometrically used, and in particular that the pseudo-maximum-likelihood of 
Poisson (PPML) significantly increases their magnitude. 
The results indicate that trade liberalization would increase the importance of exports of 
foodstuffs, especially for countries with high GDP per capita, with a consequent decrease in 
the market share of the developing countries. 
The authors emphasize the extent of their study that the fact of having placed attention 
exclusively on tariffs which, although particularly important in the agri-food sector, are not 
the only barriers that act on trade. Therefore, suggested to consider also the effect of non-tariff 
barriers (NTBs), which remain an important challenge for the analysis of trade, assuming as a 
more appropriate approach of the CES with a Gravity model. 
On the same line Yue, Beghin and Jensen (2006), Xiong and Beghin (2011b) use a constant-
elastic replacement model to incorporate the heterogeneity of the goods into a gravity model. 
Also Arkolakis & Al. (2008) and Feenstra (2009) use an CES model to study the benefits of 
international trade, by detecting how in the monopolistic competition model the amount of the 
trade depends strongly on only two parameters: The percentage change of household 
expenditure as a result of the exchange rate trade barriers, and a gravitational estimator of the 
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elasticity of imports on the variable trade barriers. Liu and Yue (2009), broaden the model of 
Yue, Beghin and Jensen (2006) by development  a methodology to quantify the combined 
effect of the two main non-tariff barriers, using an CES model with a factor that can consider 
the technical progress for incorporating changes in the quality of goods. 
Henderson and Millimet (2008) Underline how, despite the substantial theoretical foundations 
on which gravitational models based on bilateral trade, the empirical implementation requires 
different assumptions that do not follow the theory directly. Firstly, the unobserved 
commercial costs assumed to be a linear logarithmic function of the observable ones. 
Secondly, the effects of trade costs considered being constant between pairs of countries. 
Maintaining consistency with the theoretical foundations, but removing the constraints 
previously described, the gravitational model estimated with non-parametric methods. 
Parametric ones offered an equal or superior reliability regarding of sample prediction and 
out-of-sample prediction in most cases. Besides, formal statistical tests do not allow to reject 
the presence of the constraints, implying higher efficiency of the parametric models. The 
conclusion of Henderson and protector is that the gravitational model, with the assumption 
that the costs to trade are linear and homogeneous, is a correct representation of the bilateral 
trade. The results obtained by excluding zeros, contrary to what was proposed by Silva and 
Tenreyro. 
Li and Beghin (2011) Perform a meta-analysis to explain the systematic changes in the results 
of the estimates the effects of technical regulations on trade, using different methodologies 
and methods of sampling the data. The results obtained show that the agri-food industry tends 
to be more affected, or less advantageous, by these measures and barriers than what is 
happening in other sectors. The results obtained show that the agri-food industry tends to be 
more affected, or less advantageous, by these measures and barriers than what is happening in 
other sectors. Moreover,  does not consider the “multilateral resistance” increases the 
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possibility of inflating the effects of the impediment to trade due to technical regulations. 
Otherwise, is not possible to put the endogeneity potential of trade policies into an opposite 
effect, and it can lead to the erroneous conclusion that does not reduce trade. Studies using the 
MRL (maximum residual limits) tend to detect a more significant impediment to trade than 
other measures and lead to apparent effects of policies since its focused on a specific measure. 
Other proxy measures tend to generate confusion in results, increasing the likelihood of 
inconclusive results and weak policy implications. 
3.10 MODELING OF COMMERCE BARRIER 
 
As mentioned the gravity model can be enriched by several variables, including the most 
interesting ones are certainly barriers to trade (tariff and non). 
Tariff Barriers: 
It is often more complicated than it can initially appear in a gravitational model. In fact, few 
countries have a single duty for each of the 6-digit HS codes (HS 6) related to the wine in its 
different classes, which bottled, sparkling and bulky. The most common is to find differences 
in the levy depending on the alcohol degree or other parameters set by the various national 
authorities. The presence of different ranks of levy leads to the need to make an association 
between them, to obtain an average data that reflects adequately the tax operated by a state 
towards each of its suppliers, subjects also face for HS code 6. 
Transformation in ad valorem equivalent. 
The aggregation of tariffs is, however, a relatively complicated procedure, and there is still no 
universally recognized methodology as the most suitable. A first problem that arises when 
comparing the tariff profiles of different countries, often is very duties that not expressed as a 
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percentage on the value. Instead, refer to the quantity or other parameters (as can be for 
example the grad of alcoholic in the case of wine). Therefore, in these cases is necessary to 
calculate the respective AVE (ad valorem equivalent) to have a set of rates comparable to 
each other. 
The tariffs converted into the respective AVE by dividing the duty through the unit value of 
the asset. Therefore, the problem lies in the choice of the unit value, which encompasses 
different complications both from a statistical and methodological point of view. 
Theoretically, the duties have a more critical impact on goods of the higher unity of value, 
and even if the 6-digit HS classification allows to differentiate very well between different 
classes of products, however, is not entirely excluded the heterogeneity between it.  
The use of the respective unit values can initially seem very interesting, is entirely consistent 
with the size of the collected duties, also allows to operate a qualitative differentiation of the 
respective trade flows. On the other side, is more sensitive for errors in the estimation of  data 
provided by the reporting countries, and is not represented if the magnitude of trade is modest. 
Calculating the AVE based on the world average of the import proposed by Gibson & Al 
(2001) offers better guarantees regarding the robustness of the data, but without considering 
the qualitative differences between products to reflect differentiation between partner 
countries, while avoiding the excessive volatility of data. Bouët & Al (2008) proposed a 
calculation of the AVE based on the average unit value of world export, calculated from a 
group of reference countries of which the exporting member belongs. Then, each nation 
included in a group of countries with similar characteristics, defined by a hierarchical cluster 
analysis based on GDP per capita (concerning purchasing power parity) and commercial 
opening. Using the unit value of the reference group offers three main advantages: (i) 
considered the differences in the unit value between countries with different qualitative 
preferences, (ii) the problems of endogeneity deriving from the push to vary the quality of the 
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products in response to specific tariffs are more content than those that would be working 
with bilateral unit values, since the value calculated on world export; (iii) The use of the 
group of countries is more robust for estimation errors than the respective unit value; Being 
based on the median is not strongly influenced by outliers. However, once all the tariffs 
transformed into its consideration, AVE is a second methodological problem, that is to 
summarize it correctly in a single representative figure in case there are more sublines within 
the C Odice HS 6. 
Data aggregation Methodology   
The first approach to aggregating tariffs is to use the simple medium to capture the overall 
level, and the standard deviation to measure the dispersion seen as the differential of 
observations from the arithmetic average. The use of the average tariff without any weighting 
offers, however, different disadvantages. The first of these is that the tariffs have incredibly 
uneven distributions, and therefore the average cannot be the most suitable summary measure. 
In These cases, the mean value may improperly represent the central tendency, and the most 
representative measure could be the median. When the tariff profile has a normal distribution, 
the average and the median should be very close, otherwise when the distribution is not 
homogeneous both the media and the median can provide useful information. Cases recorded 
a high average, and a low median (or the opposite) suggest an extremely high (or low) 
protectionist level for a few specific product categories, while most of the tariff lines are low 
(or high). Also, Anderson and Neary (2003) criticize the use of simple media, considering it 
to be free of foundation and reporting two main problems arising from the use of the same:  
To equally treat all commodities and sensitivity to any variations in the HS classification. Of 
the same opinion Bouët & Al (2008) which consider the simple average without any 
theoretical basis, and therefore advise against its use. 
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The most commonly used methodology for aggregating tariffs remains the use of their 
weighted average , using the respective import quota valued at the border. The formula for 
calculating the weighted average rate is as follows:       
                                                                        XY =  ∑ Z[ 
∗  X[ 
Where  XY  is the tariff share to valorem of the good  k  and the weight based on the value of 
the import of the good   Z[   ∗ balancing to the total import.  
                                                                 Z[
∗ =  
\]\
∑ ^ ]
  
While this equation easy to calculate, on the other hand, this measure suffers from the higher 
price of the tariff, the higher efficiency of the restriction on trade, depending on the elasticity 
at the price of the application ( Anderson & Al., 2003; Bouët, 2008). There is no apparent 
solution to this problem (Bouët, 2008). However, many authors proposed different methods of 
weighting tariffs. The first of these is Leamer  and Levinsohn (1974), which proposes the use 
of world import as a weighting measure. However, if on the one hand this solution is able to 
solve the problems of endogeneity, on the other it does not allow to consider the specificities 
of the different national economies.  
Gibson & Al. (2001), working on a large group of nations, converted all tariffs using the unit 
value of world trade to the 6-digit HS code level, while Bureau & Al. (2004) moreover, Jank 
& Al. (2002) Used the calculated average price, but the average of the last three years on the 
8-digit HS code. The first of these two approaches influenced by some tariff spikes that may 
be present within the 6-digit HS code, while the latter has the defect of being able to use only 
data from specific countries and no the world average. Therefore, the problem of identifying a 
robust methodology but that allows at the same time to discern between the peculiarities and 
differences of the individual nations. 
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A solution to this problem proposed by Bouët & Al. (2008) In the construction of the 
MAcMap database, where once again used for weighting, import of a group of reference 
countries. The import of each group of countries then normalized taking into account the size 
of each country. 
Unfortunately, this approach, as well as other weighting methodologies that use parameters 
other than the national import, cannot be used with a higher level of detail than HS code 6, 
since HS codes with 8 or more digits differ from country to another, and therefore are not 
comparable. 
Non-Tariff Barriers: 
The inclusion of non-tariff barriers in the gravity model has also a crucial importance in the 
estimation, as reported by Raimondi and Olper (2010). The implications of these measures on 
market access mechanisms are generally more complex than a traditional barrier based on a 
tax levy, mainly because market imperfections being formed (asymmetry of information, 
externalities, etc). Therefore, the non-tariff barriers tend to change the consumer information 
set and their behaviour, as well as the behaviour of the producers. For these reasons cannot be 
easily transformed into a simple tax or equivalent price (Xiong and Beghin, 2011b). In the 
literature, different measures proposed and used to identify non-tariff barriers and to estimate 
their impact. However, is possible to classify these methodologies into four main groups: 
Estimation by frequency and coverage indexes: 
Frequency indexes shall only take into account the presence or absence of the non-tariff 
barrier in question. These indexes do not provide any further information on the respective 
value of the affected products, which can be acquired through the hedging index. The latter is 
ideally calculated using the value that the import would have assumed in the absence of the 
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NTBs (Leamer, 1990). However , this value is undetectable and the domestic or worldwide 
imports often used as an alternative weight. Despite, this approach suffers from endogeneity 
problems: if the barriers to trade actually reduce the transactions, the index is underestimated 
(Fontagné & Al. 2008). 
Deardoff and Stern (1997), mention two other limits of frequency and coverage indexes; The 
first is that do not indicate the deterrent effect that the non-tariff barriers have on the average 
of quantity and price, the goods purchased by the importer. Secondly, these indexes do not 
provide any indication of the possible effect of barriers on prices, productions and 
international trade. Dollar and Kraay (2004) claim that the hedging indexes do not seem to be 
able to capture the severity of a non-tariff barrier. 
The frequency and coverage indexes used in several studies: Nogués, Olechowski and 
Winters, (1986), analyse the impact of NTBs on the import of sixteen industrialised countries 
for the years 1981-1983, finding that non-tariff barriers influence more than 27% of the global 
import and more than 34% of import from developing countries. Other authors and institution 
who used these indexes are: OECD 1995; Fontagné, von Kirchbach and Mimouni, 2005).    
Estimation of the quantitative impact:    
When trying to quantify the NTBs, a fairly used technique which cannot be explained by the 
tariffs. A typical methodological approach is to rely on the residues of the trade determinants, 
inserted in the econometric regressions of the trade flows. 
This method uses models for estimating commercial flows (mainly gravitational models) in 
which the information on non-tariff barriers included as explanatory variables.  The 
comparison between the expected commercial flow in the absence of NTBs and the current 
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one provides information on trade restrictions operated by these barriers. Frequency or 
coverage indices usually do the insertion of barriers to trade in the model.     
Critically, this approach  justifies the trend of the trade from what the model can explain, 
using a set of political effects including the NTBs, while the model may not be able to explain 
all commercial flows, even in the absence of domestic regulations and other factors falling 
under the frontier effects. When focus on specific products and related trade flows between 
nations, the estimate becomes so sensitive to the assumptions made by the model (Beghin and 
Bureau, 2001).  
Leamer (1990) and Harrigan (1993) Use this method to determine the impact of NTBs on 
trade in 1983. The results obtained by Leamer show how trade barriers reduced the export of 
South America to major industrialized countries, while Harrigan conclude are that tariffs and 
transport costs between OECD members, significantly operate higher restriction than non-
tariff barriers. 
Otsuki & Al. (2001) Use a gravitational model to explain the determinants of trade between 
nations and to determine the effect of the European standard on aflatoxin of African export. 
Their results show that the new and more restrictive regulations seem to be the main barriers 
to the export of dried fruit. Xiong and Beghin (2011a) move two criticisms to the study of 
Otsuki & Al. (2001); The first is the time variation of the standard set by law, which makes its 
effect not distinguishable from the multilateral resistance of which it has already spoken. The 
second derives from zero elimination, which limits the economic interpretation of the model. 
Moenius (2004) based on this approach to study the impact on trade of bilaterally recognized 
(shared) and country-specific standards. Its analysis, operated on 471 production sectors in 12 
countries for the period 1980-95, shows the existence of a positive influence of the shared 
standards, while for specific ones the results vary depending on the sector. 
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Henry de Fraham and Vancauteren (2006), studying the process of integrating European 
technical regulations into the agri-food industry, highlight how harmonization helped to raise 
trade within the European Union. Finally, Fontagné & Al (2005) use the quantity-impact 
measures to estimate the effect of SPS and TBT on trade in fresh and processed foodstuffs, 
showing a significant or positive impact on most goods. 
Jayasinghe, Beghin, and Mama (2010) use the gravity model with constant elasticity of 
substitution to incorporate intermediate demand for maize seeds and to calculate the tariff 
equivalent of SPS regulations. 
Heien and Sims (2000) use a gravitational model to study the Free Trade Agreement (FTA) 
between Canada and the United States and its effect on wine export. The study attempts to 
quantify the impact of the reduction of wine export restrictions from the United States to 
Canada. The methodology foresees an initial estimate of the demand function for wines 
exported from the USA to Canada. Using data from the period before the FTA, therefore, the 
elasticities found by the estimated model, used for predict the percentage variation of the 
import, based on the historical variation of three variables: Price in Canadian dollars, 
replacement price in Canadian dollars, real wage and annual income. The difference between 
real and expected imports attributed to two remaining factors: tariffs and non-tariff barriers. 
An increase in imports of 10% calculated as a result of the removal of tariff barriers and 17% 
of non-tariffs. 
Price-wedged Estimate  
This approach based on the idea that NTBs can be estimated based on its impact on the 
domestic price in comparison with a reference price. The primary use of this method is to 
obtain a given AVE (ad valorem equivalent) of non-tariff barriers, directly comparable with 
tariffs. Since the price that would have with the total absence of barriers is not observable, the 
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effect of the price, also known as "price weight" is usually obtained by simple comparison 
between the domestic the domestic and world price in the presence of NTBs. 
There are several limitations reported by several authors of this methodology; Among these, 
the principal is that the measure of NTBs implicitly as AVE, is valid only below the 
assumption that the imported goods are perfect substitutes. There is a possibility that there is a 
distortion due to qualitative differences between domestic and imported products. Also, this 
method makes it possible to quantify the effect of NTBs set present in the market but rarely 
makes it possible to identify with certainty and precision. Finally, the comparison between 
domestic and international prices can influenced by differences in the elasticity of demand 
and supply between countries.  
Campbell and Gossette (1994) Use this method in different sectors, including food and 
agriculture, by applying quality adjustments to make comparable products. The USITC 19 
regularly uses this method to measure the AVE price differential per sector in the United 
States, even in this case adjusted according to the qualitative differences. Calvin and Krissof 
(1998) estimate the AVE of the technical regulations in the apple field, comparing the 
monthly CIF price of U.S. apples sold in foreign markets with the wholesale price found in 
these markets. The authors assume that the price differential is due to tariff and technical 
barriers in the case of similar apples (e.g., Same variety, size and quality, period, similar price 
in the sales channel). In the study, also the cost of transport taken into account, and the 
average monthly price divided into the known tariff and the non-tariff barrier AVE, which 
constitutes the residue. 
Bradford (2003) Use this methodology to calculate the AVEs using the correct import price 
with shipping costs, distribution costs, and taxes. Dean & Al. (2006) Apply price comparisons 
to a large group of nations and products, estimating the AVE using directly an equation 
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derived from a model of product differentiation based on retail price. Yue, Beghin, and Jensen 
(2006) Expand this methodology, taking into account the imperfect substitution between the 
domestic and imported goods. In particular, used a constant of elasticity substitution (CES) to 
incorporate the heterogeneity between goods in consumer preferences (qualitative 
differences), and to calculate the tariff equivalent of TBT.  
Liu and Yue (2009) also quantify the effect of the two main barriers to trade, using a CES 
model and price-wedged method. Besides, the authors resumed the extended model of Yue, 
Beghin, and Jensen (2006) by introducing a factor that could consider technical progress to 
incorporate qualitative changes in goods. Their results suggest that the elimination of non-
tariff barriers would lead to an increase in imports by the Japanese industry of cut flowers. 
Xiong and Begin (2011b) Use the AVE of SPS and TBT inserted in a gravitational model to 
estimate its effect, also separating a positive component (which increases the demand for the 
imported goods) and a negative (which decreases it). 
Estimate the price effect using the elasticity of the importer's demand 
This methodology, developed by Kee, Nadkarni, and Olarreaga (2006), also provides the 
NTBs. Using the comparative advantages methodology proposed by Leamer (1990), the 
quantitative impact of NTBs on imports at the 6-digit HS code level estimated. The Leamer 
approach based on the construction of a forecasted import model using the production factors. 
In the case of the presence of NTBs, the real import is different from that could be envisaged, 
this difference represents the impact of the barrier on trade. The quantitative impact then 
converted to AVE using the elasticity of the importer's demand.  
 The complicated calculation is the main problem that the model suffers. Moreover, the 
unavailability of detailed price data for countries and, or products often makes it impossible to 
use this method. 
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4. Econometric estimation of food dependency 
 
The evaluation of food import dependency and the prevalence of undernourishment of the 
selected six developing oil-exporting countries (Qatar, United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, 
Angola, Nigeria, and Algeria) permit to use the gravity model for the estimation. In which, 
could see a significant role of the independent variables on the influence of the foodstuffs 
import and the prevalence of undernourishment.  
The generic form that uses for this study is log-log under the following equation: 
                                _` abc =  d _` eb +  f_` ec + g _` hc − i _` jbc +  kbc 
Additionally, the study permit to use the quantile regression model for the estimation of the 
dependent variables in different quantile. Technically, Quantile regression methods have 
advantages beyond providing a richer characterization of the data. Median regression is more 
robust to outliers than least-squares regression. Moreover, quantile regression estimators can 
be consistent under weaker stochastic assumptions than possible with least-squares 
estimation. Leading examples are the maximum score estimator of Manski (1975) for binary 
outcome models and the censored least absolute deviations estimator of Powell (1984) for 
censored models. 
For a continuous random variable y, the population qth quantile is that value µq such that y is 
less than or equal to µ1 with probability 1. Thus 
                                           1 = Pr[ y ≤ µ1 ] = Fy (µ1), 
where Fy is the cumulative distribution function (cdf) of y. For example, if µ0.75 = 3 then the 
probability that y ≤ 3 equals 0.75. It follows that  
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                                                   µq = Fy−1 y (q). 
Leading examples are the median, q = 0.5, the upper quartile, q = 0.75, and the lower quartile, 
q = 0.25. For the standard normal distribution µ0.5 = 0.0, µ0.95 = 1.645, and µ0.975 = 1.960. The 
100qth percentile is the qth quantile. 
For the regression model, the population qth quantile of y conditional on x is that function µq 
(x) such that y conditional on x is less than or equal to µq (x) with probability q, where the 
probability is evaluated using the conditional distribution of y given x. It follows that 
                                               	l	 	(m) = 		n|m$#	(1),  
where Fy|x is the conditional cdf of y given x and we have suppressed the role of the 
parameters of this distribution. It is insightful to derive the quantile function µq (x) if the dgp 
is assumed to be the linear model with multiplicative heteroscedasticity 
                                                  y = xˈβ + u, 
                                                     u = xˈα × ε,  
                                                     ε ∼ iid [0 , σ2] , 
where it is assumed that xˈα > 0. Then the population qth quantile of y conditional on x is that 
function µq (x, β, α) such that 
                                              q = Pr [y ≤ µq (x , β, α )]       
                                                 = Pr [u ≤ µq (x , β, α ) − xˈβ] 
                                                 = Pr [ε ≤ [ µq (x , β, α ) − xˈβ ] / xˈβ ] 
                                     =  Fε (µq [(x , β, α ) − xˈβ] / xˈα) 
where we use u = y − xˈβ and ε = u/ xˈα, and Fε is the cdf of ε. It follows that                                        
[µq (x, β, α) − xˈβ] / xˈα = Fε−1 (q) so that  
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                    µq (x, β, α) = xˈβ + xˈα × Fε−1  (q)  
                                      = xˈ ( β + α × Fε−1  (q) ) 
Thus for the linear model with multiplicative heteroskedasticity of the form u = xˈα × ε the 
conditional quantiles are linear in x. In the special case of homoskedasticity, xˈα equals a 
constant and all conditional quantiles have the same slope and differ only in their intercept, 
which becomes larger as q increases. 
For univariate random variable y the usual way to obtain the sample quantile estimate is to 
first order the sample. Then		q q equals the [Nq]th smallest value, where N is the sample size 
and [Nq] denotes Nq rounded up to the nearest integer. For example, if N = 97, the lower 
quartile is the 25th observation since [97 × 0.25] = [24.25] = 25. Koenker and Bassett (1978) 
observed that the sample qth quantile 	q q can equivalently be expressed as the solution to the 
optimization problem of minimizing with respect to β 
r 1	|	s	– 	B|
	u
	:n		wx	
+ r (1	– 	1)|s	– 	B|
u
:n		yx
. 
This result is not obvious. To gain some understanding, consider the median, where q = 0.5. 
Then the median is the minimum of ∑ 1	z	s	– 	Bz			 . Suppose in a sample of 99 observations 
that the 50th smallest observation, the median, equals 10 and the 51st smallest observation 
equals 12. If we let β equal 12 rather than 10, then ∑ 1	z	s	– 	Bz			  will increase by 2 for the 
first 50 ordered observations and decrease by 2 for the remaining 49 observations, leading to 
an overall net increase of 50 × 2 − 49 × 2 = 2. So the 51st smallest observation is a worse 
choice than the 50th. Similarly the 49th smallest observation can be shown to be a worse 
choice than the 50th observation. 
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This objective function is then readily expanded to the linear regression case, so that the qth 
quantile regression estimator B{q minimizes over βq 
|	u	Bl = 	 r 1	|	s	– 	X~B|
	u
	:n	wx	
+ r (1	– 	1)|s	– T~	B|
u
		:n	yx
	, 
where we use βq rather than β to make clear that different choices of q estimate different 
values of β . Note that this is the asymmetric absolute loss function, where s	q 	is restricted to 
be linear in x so that e = y −X~Bl . The special case q = 0.5 is called the median regression 
estimator or the least absolute deviations estimator (Cameron & Trivedi, 2005). 
In our study, the impact of explanatory variables (oil export, crop index, gross national 
expenditure, total population, and corruption) proved on the food importation (Table 1) by 
quantiles regression. Also the impact of some other explanatory variables as food import, oil 
export, gross national expenditure, rural population, arable land, and corruption on the 
prevalence of undernourishment in the targeted countries. Where interesting results regarding 
the paradox of plenty shown in the (Table 2). The study  released econometrically by 
STATA software.  
The source of the variables ( dependents and explicative) shown in the following table:  
Variables  Unit measurement  Source of data 
Food import  $US Billion UN Comtrade 
Prevalence of undernourishment  % of population World bank 
Oil export  $US Billion UN Comtrade 
Crop index Coefficient (2004-2006=100)    World bank  
Arable land  % of land area World bank 
Gross National Expenditure % of GDP World bank 
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Total population  Million World bank  
Rural population  % of total population World bank 
Index of corruption Average score from scale 0 to 
100 
Transparency 
international  
 
Table 1: Models of the dependent variable In (food import) via OLS and Quantile 
regression (QR). 
Level of significance:  *  p ˂ 0,1  ;   ** p ˂ 0, 05 ;   *** p ˂ 0,01. 
Table 1 Analysis: The OLS estimation demonstrates that the dependent variable (food 
import) of the six selected countries related synergistically with fuel export and gross national 
expenditure by a significance level of 1% of both. In the same time, linked adversely to the 
crop index (crop productivity) with 1% of importance, and corruption by 5%. In the other 
hand, non-impact of the population on food importation. This study possesses a goodness fit 
at approximately 83% that means the model (OLS) explain the independent variables 
significantly.  
   Explanatory  variables OLS    Q (0,25) Q (0,50)    Q(0,75)
 ln (oil export)
      0,354***      0,738***    0,481***       0,431***
 In (crop index)
      -0,006***  -0,004  -0,006*      -0,002
 ln (total population) 0,179 0,172     0,434***       0,773***
 ln (gross national exp)      0,556*** 0,152   0,362** -0,144
 In (corruption)
  -0,019**      -0,043***  -0,033**     -0,047***
 R-squared 0,83 0,63 0,61         0,64
 N 96 96 96 96
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Regarding the alternative models by its different quantiles is considerably different to the 
OLS regression, could see more signification in the quantile of 25% about oil export where 
the raise of 1% of oil export lead to the raise of 0,78% of food import better than the other 
quantile of 50% and 75% that means the oil export has a good impact on the lower food 
import. About the crop index  could see its lower impact just in the 50% quantile and OLS 
that means the local food production in the selected six countries not sufficient to decrease 
significantly the food importation. Regarding the population has more impact on the greatest 
quantiles of 50% and 75% that the increment of the total population provoke more food 
importation. The gross national expenditure registers its impact just in the median quantile of 
50%  where the raise of 1% lead for the increment of the food import by 0,36% but the 
corruption decrease the food import in all the models, particularly in the quantile of 75%. 
Table 2: Models of the dependent variable In (prevalence of undernourishment) via OLS 
and quantile regressions: 
Level of significance:  *  p ˂ 0,1  ;   ** p ˂ 0, 05 ;   *** p ˂ 0,01 
Table 2 Analysis: The OLS analysis shows a full significance of all independent variables 
with the prevalence of undernourishment. Some variables react positively on 
Explanatory variables  OLS  Q (0,25) Q (0,50) Q(0,75)
    ln ( Oil export)   9,2***     4,13***     8,183***      10,86***
    ln ( Food import)  -1,707***  -3,06***  -3,45***  -3,49***
    ln ( Gross national exp)     -9,74***     -1,57***     -6,658***      -10,20***
    In (Rural pop)      -0,315*** 0,02 -0,18     -0,39***
    In ( Arable land)      -0,172***     -0,23***     -0,238***    -0,15***
    In ( Corruption)
    0,126*** 0,02 0,082 0,13*
      R-squared 0,91 0,4 0,56 0,75
      N 96 96 96 96
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undernourishment level as food import, rural population, arable land, and gross national 
expenditure in which its potential increment decreases the malnutrition significantly. 
Paradoxically, the more oil exportation in the developing countries doesn’t influence on the 
reduction of undernourishment positively. Moreover, the corruption remains the limiting 
factor in its adversary impact on food import and undernourishment. The high R-squared of 
the OLS model nearly 91,5% demonstrate the greater significance of the independent 
variables. 
The quantiles regressions for the prevalence of undernourishment also considerably different 
to OLS regression and could show a significant results in all quantiles where the food imports 
decease more the undernourishment  in the median and higher quantiles ( 50% & 75%) but 
regarding the oil export could see a contrary or negative relationship where coefficient is 
positive that means the increment of oil exportation don’t decease the undernourishment, 
particularly in the quantiles of 50% and 75%. This results confirm the theory of “the paradox 
of plenty”. The rural population registers its positive impact just in the highest quantiles of 
75% where the increment of rural population by 1% decrease the undernourishment by 
0,39%. In the same time there are not any significance in the others quantiles. About the gross 
national expenditure registers its positive impact in all quantiles, particularly in the greater 
quantiles of undernourishment by more than 10% means the food availability in the selected 
countries very related to the government subsidies. Regarding the lower availability of arable 
land could see a lower positive impact on the higher level of undernourishment by 0,15% but 
in the same time could register a significant impact in the lower quantiles under 25% of 
undernourishment. About the impact of the corruption could see a more significant impact in  
the quantiles of 75% that means the increment of the corruption increase the 
undernourishment.   
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Finally, comparing the two tables could conclude that the “oil export curse” record its highest 
significance solely (at 1%) by all models estimation ( OLS, Q0,25, Q0,50, and Q0,75) on the 
food import dependency and the increment of undernourishment rate.  
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Conclusion:  
 Food dependence on oil finance opened an economic debate in oil-exporting politics. In 
relative terms, imports of food products, which are increasingly expensive, led the oil 
governments in recent decades to introduce strategies to increase the percentage of food self-
sufficiency. The analysis of this phenomenon allows the use of empirical models that favor 
the study of trade relations between fuel countries and the exporting states of agri-food 
products. To this end, the use of gravitational models allows taking into account distance, 
population, GDP and other economic and non-economic factors that influence the flow of 
import-export. For remedy this problem, the hydrocarbon governments put in place austerity 
policies to support the financial budget. This system is, once again, a sign of economic 
instability and food insecurity of the aggravated countries, the latter, from scarce or difficult 
to use natural resources for agricultural production. In other words, being rich in natural 
resources, have been neglected in the last decades due to the presumption of the durability of 
the wealth derived from the oil that has proved to be not entirely truthful. A recent 
intervention by the developing oil-rich government to ensure the food self-sufficiency has 
been the sustainable modernization of the agricultural sector, allowing the exploitation of 
some available resources such as uncultivated land and the groundwater. The implementation 
of an efficient system of financing and crop insurance through the strengthening and 
revitalization of banks and agricultural agencies to ensure more significant mobilization of the 
credit of rural areas and for promoting agriculture in combination with higher economic 
stability.  
Agriculture could represent a viable alternative to oil in the developing countries where 
industry and technology are limited. Not to be neglected, it will be the investment in human 
capital as well as the stability of agricultural prices given the increase of the demands caused 
by the demographic growth in all the world, particularly in the developing countries. 
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The question of food security is not limited to the agricultural sector but must accompany by a 
growth of the whole economy. If the country wants a prosperous agriculture that contributes 
to the improvement of food security and sovereignty, it will also have to develop other 
strategic sectors such as services guaranteeing the funding sources that could satisfy the needs 
of farmers and rural areas in general. Without an integrated national economy, there can be no 
security or sustainable food sovereignty.  
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